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Abstract
We first analyze legal provisions relating to corporate transparency in Germany. We show that
despite the new securities trading law (WpHG) of 1995, the practical efficacy of disclosure
regulation is very low. On the one hand, the formation of business groups involving less regulated
legal forms as intermediate layers can substantially reduce transparency. On the other hand, the
implementation of the law is not practical and not very effective. We illustrate these arguments
using several examples of WpHG filings.
To illustrate the importance of transparency, we show next that German capital markets are
dominated by few large firms accounting for most of the market’s capitalization and trading
volume. Moreover, the concentration of control is very high. First, 85% of all officially listed AGs
have a dominant shareholder (controlling more than 25% of the voting rights). Second, few large
blockholders control several deciding voting blocks in listed corporations, while the majority
controls only one block.
This study is available from http://www.ecgn.ulb.ac.be/ or http://www.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/~boehmer and is part of current activities of
the European Corporate Governance Network. A previous version of the paper was included in a Preliminary Report on ownership,
voting power and disclosure the Network submitted to the European Commission (ECGN 1997). The ECGN project received financial
support from the Directorate General for Industry of European Commission (DGIII), Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei and the
Politecnico di Milano. Boehmer is grateful for financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG). We appreciate
helpful comments from Stefan Sperlich, Christian Wulff, participants at the 1997 and 1998 ECGN Conferences, the 1997
Bankenworkshop in Münster, and the finance workshops at Tilburg University and the University of Amsterdam. We would also like
to thank Holger Schäfer of the Bundesaufsichtsamt für den Wertpapierhandel Frankfurt a. M., Bureau van Dijk, Veba AG, and RWE
AG for generously providing us with data.
* ECARE and Solvay Business School, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Av. Franklin D. Roosevelt 21, B - 1050 Brussels, Tel.: +32 (2)
650-4466, Fax: +32 (2) 650-4475, e-mail: mbecht@ulb.ac.be
** Institut für Bank-, Börsen- und Versicherungswesen, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Spandauer Straße 1, D - 10178 Berlin, Tel. +49
(30) 2093-5761, Fax +49 (30) 2093-5666, e-mail: boehmer@wiwi.hu-berlin.de.i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1    INTRODUCTION                                                                                                                                         1
2    LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND IN GERMANY                                                     5
2.1 COMPANY TYPES 5
2.2 COMPANY GROUPS: DEFINITION AND PUBLICLY AVAILABLE INFORMATION 6
2.2.1 PUBLICLY ACCESSIBLE OWNERSHIP INFORMATION IN ANNUAL ACCOUNTS 8
2.2.2 PUBLICLY ACCESSIBLE OWNERSHIP INFORMATION UNRELATED TO ANNUAL ACCOUNTS 9
2.2.3 ACCESSIBILITY AND AVAILABILITY OF OWNERSHIP DATA 10
2.3 REGULATION OF SHARE CORPORATIONS (AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN) 12
2.3.1 SHAREHOLDER MEETINGS AND BOARD STRUCTURE 13
2.3.2 PROXY RULES 14
2.3.3 SHARE TYPES 14
2.3.4 OWNERSHIP VERSUS CONTROL OF AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN 15
2.4 STOCK EXCHANGES 16
2.4.1 SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR LISTED AGS 17
2.5 REGULATION OF BANKS AND INSURANCE COMPANIES 20
2.6 REGULATION OF INVESTMENT COMPANIES 21
3    ESTIMATING THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF LEGAL FORMS                                            22
3.1 THE NUMBER OF FIRMS IN GERMANY 22
3.2 THE NUMBER OF BANKS AND INSURANCE COMPANIES IN GERMANY 23
4    THE GERMAN TRANSPOSITION OF THE EU TRANSPARENCY DIRECTIVE                        23
4.1 BACKGROUND 23
4.2 THE MECHANICS OF THE NOTIFICATION PROCESS 24
4.3 WHO HAS TO REPORT VOTING STAKES? 26
4.4 TRANSPARENCY AND THE WPHG 27
4.4.1 BANKS’ PROXY VOTES ARE NOT REPORTED 27
4.4.2 VOTES OF INVESTMENT COMPANIES ARE NOT ATTRIBUTED TO ANY PARTY 28ii
4.4.3 VOTES ARE NOT ALWAYS ATTRIBUTED TO THEIR DE FACTO OWNERS 28
4.5 DATA 29
4.6 NOTIFICATION PROBLEMS 30
4.6.1 EXAMPLE OF AN ORIGINAL NOTIFICATION 30
4.6.2 WHAT IS LOST FROM NOT KNOWING THE ATTRIBUTION REASON 32
4.6.3 A LARGE NUMBER OF NOTIFICATIONS IS NOT ALWAYS INFORMATIVE 33
4.6.4 OBSCURITY OF FAMILY CONTROL 34
4.6.5 REPORTED VOTES VS. EXERCISED VOTES 35
4.6.6 HIDDEN GROUP STRUCTURES 36
5    SUMMARY STATISTICS                                                                                                                        37
5.1 SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR INDIVIDUAL COMPANIES 37
5.2 SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR BLOCKHOLDERS 38
6    SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS                                                                                                        39
7    REFERENCES                                                                                                                                           41iii
TABLE OF FIGURES
FIGURE 1. THE MECHANICS OF THE NOTIFICATION AND PUBLICATION PROCESS...............................................................82
FIGURE 2. OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE OF DEPFA AG ..........................................................................................................83
FIGURE 3. VOTING BLOCKS BY RANK OF STAKES FOR 430 OFFICIALLY LISTED AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN............................84
FIGURE 4. PERCENTILE PLOT OF THE LARGEST VOTING BLOCK IN 430 OFFICIALLY LISTED AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN..........85
FIGURE 5. HISTOGRAM OF THE LARGEST VOTING BLOCK IN 430 OFFICIALLY LISTED AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN...................86
FIGURE 6. DISTRIBUTION OF BLOCKS IN 430 OFFICIALLY LISTED AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN BY BLOCKHOLDER TYPE..........87
TABLE OF TABLES
TABLE 1: IMPORTANT LEGAL FORMS OF PRIVATE COMPANIES ...........................................................................................42
TABLE 2: DEFINITION OF CONTROL OVER A COMPANY.......................................................................................................44
TABLE 3: OWNERSHIP INFORMATION THAT MUST BE PROVIDED WITH THE ANNUAL FINANCIAL STATEMENTS....................46
TABLE 4: LEGAL REQUIREMENTS ON PUBLISHING OWNERSHIP INFORMATION....................................................................48
TABLE 5: ACCESSIBILITY AND AVAILABILITY OF OWNERSHIP DATA...................................................................................51
TABLE 6: SHAREHOLDERS’ MEETINGS AND BOARDS OF AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN............................................................52
TABLE 7: PROXY RULES.....................................................................................................................................................53
TABLE 8: IMPORTANT TYPES OF LIMITED-LIABILITY EQUITY SECURITIES ...........................................................................54
TABLE 9: LEGAL DEVICES TO LEVERAGE CONTROL RELATIVE TO OWNERSHIP IN LISTED AGS............................................55
TABLE 10: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON LISTED AGS IN 1995............................................................................................56
TABLE 11: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON SHARE TRADING AND OWNERSHIP IN 1995...........................................................57
TABLE 12: NUMBER OF COMPANIES BY INDUSTRY AND SALES IN 1990..............................................................................58
TABLE 13: TAXABLE VALUE (EINHEITSWERT) OF COMMERCIAL COMPANIES IN 1989 BY LEGAL FORM..............................59
TABLE 14: SALES TAXED WITH VALUE-ADDED TAX BY LEGAL FORM AND SALES IN 1992 ..................................................60
TABLE 15: FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN 1995.....................................................................................................................61
TABLE 16: INSURANCE COMPANIES IN 1994......................................................................................................................62
TABLE 17. REPORTED VOTING STAKES IN RWE AG AS REPORTED BY BAWE...................................................................63
TABLE 18. REPORTED VOTING STAKES IN AACHENER UND MÜNCHENER VERSICHERUNG AG..........................................64
TABLE 19. REPORTED VOTING STAKES IN AGIV AG: SOURCE OF ATTRIBUTED VOTES IS AMBIGUOUS..............................65
TABLE 20. REPORTED VOTING STAKES IN RHENAG AG: PARENT COMPANY IS AMBIGUOUS ..............................................66
TABLE 21. REPORTED VOTING STAKES IN MARKT- UND KÜHLHALLEN AG: NUMBER OF BLOCKS.....................................67
TABLE 22. NOTIFIED VOTING STAKES IN MONACHIA AG: NUMBER OF BLOCKS.................................................................68
TABLE 23. NUMBER OF ENTRIES PER NOTIFIED COMPANY .................................................................................................69
TABLE 24. COMPANIES WITH THE LARGEST NUMBER OF NOTIFICATIONS ...........................................................................70
TABLE 25. REPORTED VOTING STAKES IN TARKETT AG: NUMBER OF ENTRIES PER VOTING BLOCK VS. INFORMATION
CONTENT..................................................................................................................................................................71iv
TABLE 26. REPORTED VOTING STAKES IN HERLITZ AG: INFORMAL FAMILY POOLS ARE NOT REPORTED ...........................72
TABLE 27. REPORTED VOTING STAKES IN VEBA AG..........................................................................................................73
TABLE 28. EXERCISED VOTES AT VEBA AG’S ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING, 23 MAY 1996...............................................74
TABLE 29. REPORTED VOTING STAKES IN DEPFA AG: NO GROUP STRUCTURE REPORTED...............................................75
TABLE 30. CONCENTRATION OF VOTING BLOCKS OF 430 OFFICIALLY LISTED AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN.............................77
TABLE 31. NUMBER OF BLOCKS IN 430 OFFICIALLY LISTED AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN......................................................78
TABLE 32. SHAREHOLDERS CONTROLLING VOTES IN 4 OR MORE OFFICIALLY LISTED AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN................79
TABLE 33. NUMBER OF BLOCKHOLDERS AND THE NUMBER OF THEIR HOLDINGS IN 430 OFFICIALLY LISTED
AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN.........................................................................................................................................80
TABLE 34. CONTROL OF VOTING BLOCKS BY BLOCKHOLDER TYPE OF SHAREHOLDER IN 430 OFFICIALLY LISTED
AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN..........................................................................................................................................811 Introduction1
The purpose of this report is to provide an exploratory description and analysis of the
transparency of ownership and control structures in Germany. In addition to a comprehensive legal
survey, we present descriptive statistics on the concentration of voting rights. This is an original
contribution because such data became first available in December 1996. The quantitative analysis
draws on the German transposition of the EU Transparency Directive (88/627/EEC). Hence, our
statistical analysis also puts the effectiveness of this piece of legislation to the test. The paper is
based on the German contribution to a project that has sought to explore these issues for a number
of European countries.2
The concept of immediate disclosure and rigorous transparency is largely a novelty for
German financial markets. Since it is a precondition for functioning public equity markets, it has
been advanced by recent German legislation (WpHG and KonTraG, discussed in detail below) in
the context of EU initiatives to harmonize and promote the financial markets of member countries.
The German Federal Securities Supervisory Office, the Bundesaufsichtsamt für den
Wertpapierhandel (BAWe), was established under the German Securities Trading Act
(Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, WpHG) in 1995. The underlying legislation was passed on 26 July 1994
(Zweites Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz). Before these changes, publication requirements were
largely limited to financial statements.
Enhancing the transparency of ownership and control structures is one of the declared goals
of the BAWe: „Transparency is an essential element for the proper functioning of a financial
market. It is not only interesting to know who holds the voting rights in a listed company but also
constitutes an important prerequisite for achieving transparent securities markets. The timely
publication of significant purchases and sales facilitates investor decisions and limits the possible
misuse of inside knowledge“ (http://www.bawe.de, 1997). This view is not unique to the EU or the
BAWe. Recently the OECD has put forward similar recommendations as guidelines for its member
countries (OECD Internal Documents SG/CG (98) 6 and SG/CG (98) 9).
From a cash-flow point of view, transparency is important because it is valuable for
investors to know what cash-flow rights they are acquiring when they purchase a particular stock.
An investor who buys the shares of Allianz Holding AG is not merely purchasing cash-flow rights
                                                
1 Sections 2 and 3 of this report and the associated tables are taken from Boehmer (1999a).
2 See European Corporate Governance Network (1997) and http://www.ecgn.org.2
in an insurance company. The investor is purchasing a portfolio that includes insurance companies,
reinsurance companies, banks, and non-financial companies in Germany and abroad. Many of these
companies hold equity portfolios themselves. Therefore, to value his investment appropriately, an
investor depends on information about companies contributing to the financial success of the firm
he is investing in.
From the control perspective, transparency is important because it is also valuable to
investors to know who is making the important long-term decisions in the company he invests in. Is
the company controlled by a coalition of small shareholders? Is the company controlled by a family?
Is the company controlled by its managers? Is it possible for an outsider to launch a hostile takeover
bid? Investors should have the right to know who their business partners are and who is taking care
of their money. Without knowing their identity, it is impossible for investors to assess whether the
firm will be managed in their interest or whether it will adhere to other goals like the maximization
of its value to debtors, the government, other stakeholders, and so forth. Transparency of the
separation of ownership and control allows investors to assess the motivation of those who control
the company. Investors are not indifferent to the information that a company is run by managers that
have no cash flow stakes, a bank that controls the company using proxy votes, or by a large owner
with a substantial cash flow stake.
From the insider trading perspective, it is important to note that „insiders” are not just those
working inside a company. Anybody can be an insider as long as he or she has access to material
price-relevant information that has not yet been revealed to other market participants. Transparency
is an important safeguard against insider trading. Those who potentially have access to such
information can be identified and supervised.
The transparency of the board composition, the remuneration of the management, and the
professional history of management and board members are also of interest to the investor.
Interlocking directorates are yet another device that can be used to separate ownership from control.
I only touch upon these broader aspects of transparency in the current study. The link between
ownership, control, disclosure, transparency, and board composition will be the subject of future
research.
Fairness, in its widest sense, is yet another motivation for effective disclosure and
transparency. Large investors like banks, insurance companies, non-financial companies, and
wealthy individuals may have the means to obtain the information they require making investment
decisions and exerting control. The Deutsche Bundesbank maintains company information3
databases that are accessible to banks. The motivation is to contribute to the stability of the financial
system. Wealthy individuals can count on the services of specialized credit-rating agencies that, like
detective agencies, will collect the information they require in making decisions. Ordinary investors
do not have such means at their disposition, yet are necessary to channel private funds into
corporations. Transparency can help to insure that they get a chance to make equity investments on
the same terms as the powerful and the wealthy, thereby providing liquidity to capital markets.
Transparency also helps to ensure that small shareholders are not exploited or, at least, that they
have a chance to learn about it as quickly as possible.
Potential costs to transparency certainly exist, but their consequences are often not well
defined. First, Perotti and von Thadden (1998) show that transparency increases the variability of
profits and output. Therefore, creditor-controlled firms will discourage transparency to increase the
value of the firm’s debt. On the other hand, increasing variability is not detrimental to diversified
shareholders. Second, it is frequently argued that transparency may hurt a firm’s competitive
position in the product market. For example, § 313 III HGB states that, among other items,
information on the ownership of firms need not be disclosed if it would constitute a disadvantage to
the parent company. Since modern economic theory and financial evidence offer no clue as to why
disclosing ownership could be detrimental to the parent, the intentions of such provisions and
arguments derived from them remain nebulous. Especially in the case of publicly traded subsidiaries
the benefit to (minority) shareholders of knowing who controls their investment should be weighted
against initiatives to the contrary.
From a European perspective, transparency is an important requirement for creating a truly
integrated capital and product market. For listed companies, transparency can help to ensure the
equal and fair treatment of all investors, no matter in which EU country they reside. For all
companies, transparency is important in the fight against money laundering, organized crime, and
free-riding that undermines the common tax base, and is reassuring for suppliers and customers.
Most Germans know who owns and controls important non-listed companies like Quelle and
Bertelsmann. Non-German EU citizens and companies probably do not know, but should be given
easy access to this information.3
If ownership and control of German companies were to be transparent, what information
would have to be disclosed? To compute the ultimate ownership of cash-flow rights it would be
                                                
3 See Becht (1997) where the European perspective is developed further.4
necessary to know the complete cash-flow perimeter of a listed company. This includes all cash-
flow links (percentages of capital at par value) of all companies that are linked, directly or
indirectly, with the listed company, both in the ownership and portfolio dimension. Allianz Holding
AG would have to disclose its significant shareholders (larger than, say, 0.25%) and the holdings of
all companies in its portfolio, the holdings of those companies, and so forth, where it exercises
voting rights. The marginal cost of emanating such information would be close to zero if electronic
devices were used. We will show below that under current legislation and reporting practice it is
impossible to obtain meaningful information on the cash-flow perimeter.
The control perimeter is more difficult to measure than the cash-flow perimeter. Control is
hard to define because in Germany it is not always proportional to voting power. When ownership is
dispersed, voting 30% of the votes at an annual general meeting (AGM) can represent a majority.
Since control is so hard to define, the transparency of control structures is a particularly difficult
subject. The disclosure and transparency of the control structure for listed companies, when control
is measured by voting power, is one of the focal points of this study.
In Germany there are numerous legal devices that can be used to separate ownership, voting
power and control. These include voting pacts (formal and informal), control and cash flow
contracts, proxy voting, voting right restrictions, and pyramiding. We will show that it is very hard
to connect the cash-flow perimeter with the control perimeter and obtain the information that would
be necessary to compute, even approximately, quantitative measures of the separation between
ownership and control. For example, Adams (1994) documents that cross-holdings of shares
between different companies are pervasive in Germany. Especially in this case, the cash flow rights
can be obtained from annual reports. It is very difficult, however, to determine which firm or which
individuals ultimately are the most powerful in the organization and therefore responsible for
decision making.
In Section 2, we first analyze legal disclosure requirements for all important legal forms in
Germany. This discussion provides a general description of the environment in which German firms
operate. After defining various legal forms and groups, we discuss the information content of annual
reports and other company publications. Here we put a special emphasis on ownership and control
information that can be extracted from publicly available documents and on how difficult it is to
obtain. Next, we describe the special regulation affecting AGs, stock exchanges, banks, investment
companies, and insurance companies. In Section 3, we present descriptive statistics on the relative
importance of the respective legal forms in Germany. Here we also provide basic information on the5
distribution of legal forms across size classes and industries. Section 4 is devoted exclusively to the
German implementation of the Transparency Directive. We first discuss the mechanics of the
resulting control reporting system and then focus on the shortcomings of the current practice. We
document several obstacles to true transparency. We find that some are due to the way the German
security law was designed, while others are due to the way the competent authority (the BAWe)
implemented the law. To document these shortcomings we provide several examples. In Section 5,
we use the data generated by the new securities law (the WpHG) and present descriptive statistics
on distribution of voting blocks in German AGs that are listed on (at least) one of the official
markets. This section illustrates the high concentration of ownership and control in Germany and
the implicit importance of its transparency. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Legal and institutional background in Germany4
In this section, we focus on the legal and institutional background in Germany. To assess the
transparency of German ownership and control structures, it is necessary to understand disclosure
rules and differences across legal forms. Disclosure and transparency are of greatest importance for
the development of equity markets. Since they are the only legal forms that can be listed, we put the
emphasis on Aktiengesellschaften. Other legal forms also play an important role, because they are
frequently part of the same group as listed AGs. Listed companies may own and control non-listed
companies and vice versa. As we will argue below, group structures that involve listed and non-
listed companies pose the biggest challenge for disclosure and transparency because they
simultaneously involve firms with strict disclosure rules and firms with lax disclosure rules.
Overall, transparency is difficult to ensure in these cases.
2.1 Company types
German commercial laws define several ways to organize firms with limited or unlimited
liability for owners. Table 1 lists the basic characteristics of the most important legal forms of
German firms. The most relevant legal distinction is between AGs and GmbHs
(Kapitalgesellschaften), which provide limited liability to owners, and other legal forms. All
limited-liability firms are heavily regulated, while other forms have considerable freedom in
designing company statutes and contractual relations between owners and other stakeholders. We
try to describe the extent of this freedom by a subjective assessment of the degree of imperativeness6
of the legal rules (last column). It should be noted that some „low imperativeness“ forms are of
substantial importance in Germany, most notably Vereine (unions) and Stiftungen (foundations).
Vereine (unions) sometimes appear as organizational form of large enterprises (for example, the
largest German automobile association (ADAC) is organized as a Verein, and so are all soccer
clubs).5 Stiftungen often appear as dominant stakeholders or sole owners of the largest companies.6
Other forms like the GbR or the stille Gesellschaft play only minor roles among larger firms.
2.2 Company groups: Definition and publicly available information
Ownership, even in business groups, is relatively easy to define and to measure. In contrast,
it is far more difficult to measure „control,“ especially in business groups. To assess the
transparency of control structures in Germany we need a definition of control that is (i) measurable
and (ii) publicly observable.
Germany has no legal or otherwise official definition of a holding company or a group.
Groups usually must, however, prepare consolidated annual reports and play a role concerning
several types of regulation. Table 2 provides summaries of various legal definitions of control in
German law, while Table 3 lists ownership-related information that must be published in the annual
accounts. In the following discussion, we relate the control definitions of different legal codes to the
publication requirements associated with them.
With the exception of the banking code, each row in Table 2 corresponds to control
information that is, at least theoretically, public information. Generally speaking, control is most
easily defined in terms of a blocking majority of voting rights or contractual arrangements
delegating the decision power over the resources of a firm. Thus, in basic terms, we should consider
companies that are ultimately majority controlled by a common parent as belonging to the same
group. This is the basic idea behind the definition of groups in Germany's commercial code (HGB).
The relevant part of the code governs how incorporated firms (AGs, KGaAs, and GmbHs) have to
consolidate subsidiaries, whether fully or partially owned, into their annual financial report. With
respect to effective disclosure, this regulation has two effects. First, after identifying all parent
companies, one could construct a tree containing all major stakes held by this company. Second, §
285 XIV requires that all incorporated firms state which company includes them in its consolidated
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and, for brevity, are generally not repeated in the body of the paper.
5 Currently, the larger clubs contemplate following the British model and convert to corporations.
6 Herrman (1997) analyzes the financial performance of companies led by Stiftungen.7
accounts. Consequently, the HGB definition allows identifying groups as long as incorporated firms
are involved. It does not provide sufficient information on group structures if the group hierarchy
includes different legal forms.
The group definitions of the corporate code (AktG) serve as a basis for various legal
requirements concerning AGs. Most notably, if a company owns more than 20% of the shares of an
AG, it has to report this holding to that corporation, which in turn must publish this information in
its annual financial report. The shortcoming in terms of effective disclosure is, again, that only
shares held by incorporated firms in the same are affected by this regulation.
The PublizitaetsG governs most unlimited-liability companies that exceed moderate size
criteria (see Table 2). Its primary intention is to require all but the smallest firms to publish their
annual reports in a format similar to incorporated firms, except that § 285 XIV is not extended to
these firms (there is no requirement to publish the parent company). Another notable deviation is
stated in § 5 II, which exempts most unincorporated legal forms (OHG, GmbH & Co KG, KG, and
GbR) from annually publishing their stakes in other firms.
The WpHG, the German transposition of the EU Transparency Directive (discussed in detail
below), yields the most comprehensive control information, albeit only for the few incorporated
firms that have their shares listed on an official German market.
Control information of potentially similar richness is prompted by the German antitrust code
(GWB) for a similarly small set of firms. Once a firm has to file a change in ownership or voting
blocks crossing 25% or 50% (which could be caused by a stake sale, a formal voting arrangement,
appointing at least 50% of the managing or supervisory board, or other means), it must provide very
detailed information on its ownership structure.7 The reason is the GWB's requirement that each
acquiror of such a stake must disclose the complete group structure to the BKartA (the federal
antitrust office). This information is published monthly for approved stake purchases. The
regulation, however, affects only firms that (i) are sufficiently large (bidder and target jointly exceed
DM 500 Mio. in sales),8 (ii) succeed in purchasing a stake prompting the filing requirement, and
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(iii) do not wish to exert sufficient effort to disguise their group structure.9 Finally, the KWG
defines financial and banking groups without directly requiring public disclosures.
2.2.1 Publicly accessible ownership information in annual accounts
Table 3 provides a detailed account of ownership information that firms of different legal
forms must provide with or in their annual reports. While public disclosure of annual reports is
mandatory for all larger firms (see endnote 1 in Table 3), the control information included in these
reports varies greatly across legal forms. With the exception of GmbHs, no firm must reveal the
identity of owners who are individuals in its annual report. In contrast, if a company owns more
than 25% in an AG, KGaA, or an eG, the latter must include this information in its annual report. In
addition, AGs, GmbHs, KGaAs, eGs, and large Vereine must include their own stakes in other
firms, if they exceed 20%.10 Overall, the most stringent publication requirements are associated with
incorporated firms, while other legal forms are often not required to provide such information
annually.
 The loose disclosure regulation of some legal forms has a propagation effect. Consider, for
example, the notification of a 25% stake in an AG to that corporation required by § 20 AktG. While
that article stipulates that stakes held by firms belonging to a group must be cumulated, it seems
plausible that this notification could substantially understate the true stake size of a group if that
group includes layer(s) of unincorporated firms; no regulator or investor can generally associate the
group structure above with that below, because the intermediate layer is not required to publish
ownership information.
To conclude, the publication requirements in Table 3 may provide comprehensive ownership
information for some firms, but are certainly not sufficient to construct a systematic picture of
control structures in Germany. Although the filings based on the WpHG provide a substantially
deeper picture of ownership of officially listed AGs (with the shortcomings discussed below), the
additional publication requirements discussed above also affect the quality of these filings.
To see that these requirements are the weak link in the chain, consider the following
example. Let us presume that the parent company of a group controlling votes in a listed AG does
                                                
9 Several conversations with BKartA officials indicate quite a few instances where acquirors attempted to avoid filing requirements
by engaging in various attempts to hide the size of the stake purchased (for example, by distributing the new stake over several
individuals or firms) or the ultimate owner of the acquiror.
10 Stakes do not have to be reported if their effect on the firm’s financial status is deemed minor or if disclosure would harm the9
not wish to make the true degree of control public. The parent company should limit the votes held
directly to the degree it wishes to disclose them. Since votes held by subsidiaries that cannot be
traced back to the parent company are suitable to be overlooked, all other necessary votes should be
held by these subsidiaries. Then the group should structure itself such that one (or more) layers
consist of unincorporated firms. The more such layers are part of the group, the less probable it is
that the true group structure is publicly known, and the less likely are WpHG filings providing true
transparency, because votes controlled by unincorporated subsidiaries or their daughter firms can
hardly be linked to the parent.
2.2.2 Publicly accessible ownership information unrelated to annual accounts
In this section, we discuss publication requirements regarding founders, company statutes,
and owners, as well as restrictions on share transfers and repurchases of own shares. Especially
company statutes and related contractual arrangements provide valuable control information,
because German companies frequently enter contracts where one company fully foregoes claims on
profits or decision power in favor of another company. For AGs and KGaAs these contracts are
tightly regulated and must be filed with the company register, making them publicly accessible.11
Similar contracts involving other legal forms are not directly regulated, providing potential
loopholes as far as transparency is concerned.
Table 4 lists the publication requirements for each of the legal forms introduced above. It
should be noted that we use the term 'publication' in the sense of information being publicly
accessible, which does not generally imply that it can be obtained easily, quickly, or from a single,
centralized source. Issues relating to the availability of information are discussed in section 2.2.3.
All incorporated firms, cooperatives, and unions must file company statutes. All legal forms
except eGs that have physical founders must file the identity of these individuals. The GbR is a less
common form of organization, because it is hardly regulated and prone to fraudulent activities. The
‘stille Gesellschaft’ is not a stand-alone entity, but rather an extremely flexible way to become a
stakeholder in any other legal form. The German word ‘
describes the purpose of this legal form well. Via a suitable contractual agreement, a quiet partner
can obtain equity-like claims, debt-like claims, or a mixture of both. This contract does not have to
be disclosed to the extent it is not covered by laws like §§ 297-318 AktG (governing contracts
delegating control or cash flow rights that involve incorporated firms).10
A different picture emerges for information about current company owners (as opposed to
founders). All companies (except the ones not filing their founders) but AGs must keep the
company register up to date with respect to owners. In the context of the transparency of groups, this
implies that an unlisted AG where each shareholder owns less than 20% is the easiest way to
disguise group structures: as soon as such an AG is used as an intermediate group layer, it becomes
virtually impossible to link group levels below the AG to group levels above. Owners smaller than
20% do not have to be included in the AG’s annual report and none of the owners must publicize its
stake in that AG. This is actually an example for a situation where not even WpHG (transparency
directive) filings may be effective. Assuming that this AG owned a majority of another listed AG
and some ultimate parent had majority control over three 19% shareholders in the unlisted AG, the
WpHG would require the parent to disclose its majority control over the listed AG. However, since
there is no way to identify the owners of the unlisted AG, the parent may refrain from reporting
appropriately without fear of sanctions.
AGs do have to file participation lists for each annual general meeting (AGM). This list
provides the identity of each individual or organization exercising votes. In practice, it does not
substantially help identifying the AG’s ownership structure, because proxy votes delegated to banks,
individuals, or organizations cannot be traced back to their real owners. This is true even if the real
owner has given explicit instructions on how to vote the shares (see endnote 3 in Table 4).
If they are not already implied by the nature of the legal form (for example, in the case of
unlimited-liability firms), company statutes may generally impose restrictions on the transfer of
ownership. For example, AGs are free to create registered shares and require company approval for
transfers. While industrial companies rarely use such restrictions, most insurance companies
organized as AGs employ them, even when they are listed on a stock exchange. Finally, with the
stated reason of creditor protection, if share repurchases are allowed, they are tightly regulated.
2.2.3 Accessibility and availability of ownership data
All companies that are required to make their annual reports public must file them with the
responsible company register. The company register then has to publish the filings in the official
newspaper of the federal government (Bundesanzeiger) and, in addition, in another newspaper.12
Several filings, however, are exempt from newspaper publishing. For example, participation lists of
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AGMs and the identity of limited partners of a KG must be reported to the register (and are publicly
accessible there), but need not be published elsewhere. The reasons that the publication requirement
does not imply that 'publicly accessible' information is easily, quickly, or systematically available to
the public is summarized in Table 5 and discussed in the following.
2.2.3.1 Company registers
Company registers are decentralized and operated by local courts13 and firms must file their
documents to each local court where they operate a business. Several obstacles exist to actually
obtaining this publicly accessible information.
• First, to obtain filings of a particular company, one must approach a potentially very distant court
where the company of interest operates a business.
• Second, the typical register stores all information on paper and is confined to a few rooms in the
local court building. This has the consequence that generally only the most recent filings are on
site, while older documents are deposited in some archive without public access. Court
employees will then take requests to transport the filings to the court for inspection. Since most
courts are significantly understaffed, this may require a couple of days or weeks.
• Third, filings are sorted by company, but not by the type of document. Thus, to obtain, say, the
items on the agenda of an AGM for a period of 10 years, one often has to search manually
through thousands of pages.
• Fourth, and perhaps most serious, most companies simply violate the law by not furnishing
mandatory filings. Hansen (1996, p. 56) estimates that two thirds of German companies break the
law in this way. He argues that because of understaffing, courts are not able to sanction or even
recognize these violations. While the largest firms most likely experience sufficient public
scrutiny to fear adverse publicity if they do not file, this may not be a credible threat for smaller
firms. In particular, for smaller holding companies on some intermediate group level simply not
filing required documents might represent a blunt alternative to more elaborate disguises of
control structures. The maximum penalty for such a violation is a modest DM 10,000.14
In short, company registers theoretically provide valuable information about control
structures. In practice, if the required filings have actually been made, it is very difficult and time
consuming to obtain such information.
2.2.3.2 Bundesanzeiger
The Bundesanzeiger is an official newspaper of the federal government serving various
purposes. It includes partial company register filings and/or references to other papers where related
firm data has been published. The relevant part of the Bundesanzeiger is available on CD-ROM
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from 1991 onwards. Since the relevant Bundesanzeiger section obtains its content from the
company registers, it cannot be more informative than the registers. While the CD-ROMs make a
search substantially faster compared to the registers, they are of limited use. First, each CD contains
one calendar quarter of filings. For example, to determine the owners of a GmbH one must
potentially search dozens of CDs. An index CD is available, but personal experience proves it
incomplete and of a cumbersome structure that substantially reduces search efficiency. Second,
owners of GmbHs that last changed ownership before 1991 cannot be identified electronically and
the relevant filing would have to be searched by going through paper copies page by page. In short,
the Bundesanzeiger has been designed for official announcements and not for easy access to
information.
2.2.3.3 Federal securities office (BAWe)
The BAWe publishes share-price relevant announcements (required by insider trading
regulation) continuously and information on voting stakes in listed firms annually. In its recent
annual report (BAWe 1997), it announces further steps to provide voting information more
promptly. A first step in this direction has been taken by improving BAWe (1996) and by
publishing bi-monthly cross-sections on the Internet.
2.2.3.4 Federal antitrust office (BKartA)
The BKartA publishes all filings related to successful and approved stake purchases and
takeovers in its bi-monthly newsletter. It generally follows an information-friendly approach in
providing access to data on completed transactions.
2.2.3.5 Federal banking and insurance supervision
Both offices publish only aggregate information and are not allowed to provide details on
individual-firm filings.
2.3 Regulation of share corporations (Aktiengesellschaften)
Since AGs are the only legal form that may list on a stock exchange, we discuss their
features in more detail below.13
2.3.1 Shareholder meetings and board structure
The AG has three governing bodies: the AGM (Hauptversammlung), a supervisory board
(Aufsichtsrat), and a managing board (Vorstand). In the AGM, shareholders generally decide by
simple majority, although the law or statutes may require different voting rules.15 The supervisory
board must have at least three members16 and includes worker representatives for all but the
smallest AGs.17 The supervisory board elects the managing board that must have at least one
member.18 No supervisory-board member may be on the managing board or in a position of similar
executive power.19
Table 6 describes selected features of AGMs and boards for German AGs. To call an
irregular AGM, at least 5% of capital is necessary, although company statutes may specify a smaller
percentage. In Germany, no individual compensation package of board members must be published.
Aggregates are included in the annual reports. Similarly, executive trading in their firm’s shares
could be traced by the BAWe (after 1995), but is not made public. Both potentially beneficial
disclosure requirements would be in conflict with Germany’s strong legal protection of personal
data.
Very revealing with respect to transparency are several suits advanced by Ekkehard Wenger
for disclosure of stakes in other firms and hidden reserves.20 For example, in Wenger vs. Siemens
AG (see endnote 6 in Table 6) the court compared a shareholder’s request for disclosure of stakes
held by the firm to the information provided to the general public as intended by the EU
Transparency Directive. It ruled that shareholders should have at least the information that is soon
available to the public. Observers expect similar rulings on related issues in the future (see
Schneider 1995). The fact that a court ruling is necessary to reassure this basic right of shareholders
illustrates well the German tradition of preserving the incumbents’ power by emanating as little
information about the firm’s activities as possible.
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Finally, the corporate code also provides for legal suits by shareholders against executives.
§§ 93 and 116 AktG define the fiduciary duty of the members of both boards and make executives
personally liable for damages they have caused to the company by violating these duties.
2.3.2 Proxy rules
§ 135 AktG governs how shareholders can name proxy agents as their representatives at the
AGM (summarized in Table 7). Any organization, bank, or other agent of the shareholder may cast
the proxy vote. The shareholder has the option to reveal his name, regardless of whether he provides
explicit instructions how to vote his shares or not. Typically, shareholders remain anonymous,
deposit their shares with banks, and grant general power of attorney to that bank with respect to all
shares in their portfolio.
2.3.3 Share types
Information on different share types is presented in Table 8. AGs must issue common stock
(Stammaktien) with one vote per share.21 In addition, up to 50% of total capital can be preferred
stock (Vorzugsaktien), where each share receives a cumulative, preferential dividend.22 The
preference can be defined, for example, in terms of seniority to the dividend claim of common stock
or in terms of a larger dividend. Given the preference, these shares may be issued without the right
to vote. Strictly speaking, however, these shares do have a (dormant) vote; § 140 II requires that
each preferred share has a vote if the preferred dividend is not paid for two years in a row. In
addition, preferred-share holders may have the right to vote in matters of special interest to them.23
In addition, firms may issue Genußscheine (participation rights), that are very similar to U.S.
type preferred stock. These rights have no voting rights attached and may be designed sufficiently
debt-like to make dividends tax deductible or equity-like to be included in banks’ equity capital.
Although Genußscheine can be listed on stock exchanges, banks (one prominent exception is
family-owned Bertelsmann AG, whose only listed securities are Genußscheine) primarily use them.
New issues of equity securities generally require a 75% majority at the AGM.
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2.3.4 Ownership versus control of Aktiengesellschaften
German law allows various devices that detach control rights from cash flow rights. Table 9
summarizes the most important practices and their implications for transparency. First, shares may
have limited, but not multiple voting rights. As discussed in the previous section, the AktG
explicitly allows nonvoting shares up to the amount of ordinary shares outstanding.24 Non-voting
shares are a potentially powerful mechanism to double the relative voting power of ordinary shares,
but are primarily used by relatively small, family-owned companies. In addition, those controlling
the majority of voting shares and non-voting shares can turn non-voting shares into voting shares.
Since the ownership of non-voting share is not usually disclosed, they can represent an important
pool of hidden voting power.
In contrast, multiple voting rights per share are generally illegal, but may be authorized by
state authorities.25 Company statutes may further impose voting caps that limit the percentage of
votes by individual shareholders.26 In practice, multiple voting rights are of little importance and
limited to a few formerly state-owned firms. Voting caps are often claimed to reduce the power of
large shareholders. It is not clear, however, how appropriately structured informal voting pacts to
overcome the caps could be detected. Voting caps have an adverse effect on transparency: large
voting power cannot be exercised once it is revealed. Again, the company statutes containing the
voting cap information can be difficult to obtain (see the discussion on access to company registers).
Large share blocks in themselves do not leverage voting power relative to the ownership of
cash-flow rights. However, the weak protection of minority shareholders effectively allows sizeable
transfers to blockholders once a coalition owns at least 75% of the votes. Specifically, a 75%
majority may legally make a binding tender offer to minority shareholders below the market price.27
In this sense, a 75% coalition effectively controls 100% of the voting rights. Given the power of
blockholders on corporate disclosure policy, its effect on transparency hinges on the blockholders’
attitude towards disclosure.28
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Probably the most important devices to leverage control are group structures involving cross
shareholdings, contractual arrangements, and pyramids. Cross holdings effectively imply
(potentially illegal) holdings of own shares and increase the voting power of any existing
blockholder. In addition, they promote inefficient ‘voting cartels,’ where involved management
teams vote in favor of each other at the respective AGMs. Contractual arrangements delegating
control are widely used within German groups. Pyramids with outside equity on various levels may
concentrate highly leveraged control at the top layer. To the extent that intermediate group levels do
not have to report ownership or stakes held, pyramids substantially reduce transparency.
Finally, supervisory-board composition may have substantial influence on control leverage.
First, some shareholders may have a high board representation relative to their shareholdings. This
is true especially for banks and other financial institutions. To the extent that represented banks also
hold debt, their incentive to provide transparency to other shareholders may be very limited. Second,
personal interlocks between companies have the same effect as cross holdings.
2.4 Stock exchanges
Eight regional exchanges operate in Germany and state authorities primarily regulate each.
The major market is in Frankfurt and is owned by Deutsche Börse AG, a holding company that in
turn is owned primarily by banks, specialists (Kursmakler), and brokers (Freimakler). The other
seven regional exchanges operate in Berlin, Bremen, Düsseldorf, Hamburg, Hannover, München,
and Stuttgart. Each exchange operates three market segments: amtlicher Handel (official market),
geregelter Markt (regulated market), and Freiverkehr (OTC). Since 1997, Frankfurt additionally
operates Neuer Markt (new market) to accommodate young growth firms.
Table 10 lists the number of firms, their aggregate market capitalization, and the number of
IPOs between 1977 and 1995 on each market segment. In terms of market capitalization, the
official markets have about 42 times the size of the regulated markets, and about 66 times the size
of the OTC markets. Put differently, its capitalization of DM 795 billion amounts to 96% of total
capitalization. Shares in the OTC markets are dominated by foreign firms, which account for 87%
of all OTC firms.
Among the major segments, several trading systems exist. First, approximately the largest
100 firms are traded continuously on IBIS, a computerized trading system. Second, round lots in
most officially listed firms can be traded with variable prices. Third, all other orders are filled at the
Kassakurs, a price set daily to maximize transaction volume based on the order book.17
Table 11 provides some basic descriptive statistics on share trading and ownership in
Germany for exchange-listed shares. First, both trading and market capitalization is highly
concentrated: the 5% most actively traded AGs account for 83% of all trading (in terms of DM
volume), and the 5% largest AGs account for 67% of total market capitalization. The most
important types of shareholders are companies, owning about 42% of all shares. Banks, insurance,
and investment companies together own 30%, foreign owners 9%, the government 4%, and private
households 15%. Only little above 5% of the population hold stock, and taken together stock
accounts for only 5% of total assets held by private households.
2.4.1 Special requirements for listed AGs
2.4.1.1 Recent legislation
On May 1, 1998, a new legislation relating to several aspects of interest for this study
became effective.29 The Law for Control and Transparency in the Corporate Sector (Gesetz zur
Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich, KonTraG) explicitly aims at reducing the
divergence to the one share – one vote paradigm. It changes previous legislation governing the
supervisory board, the voting behavior at AGMs, and share ownership by banks. Its main features
relevant to this study are discussed below.
Regarding the supervisory board, it limits the number of mandates held by a single person to
ten (chairmanship is counted as two mandates) and increases the annual minimum number of board
meetings from two to four for exchange-listed corporations. More related to the discussion of
transparency is the novel requirement that corporations publish the number of board meetings and
how many mandates board members hold in total in their annual report. Finally, 5% of share capital
or a par value of DM 1 million is sufficient to initiate damage claims against board members
(formerly 10%).
Regarding voting rights at AGMs, the legislation outlaws multiple voting rights and voting
caps. Existing mechanisms must be phased out over a period of five years and two years,
respectively. Moreover, the AGM can terminate multiple voting rights by a simple majority of book
capital (paying an unspecified amount as compensation). All exchange-listed corporations must
publish ownership exceeding 5% (formerly 25%) of the equity capital of  „large corporations” in
their annual report.
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Finally, the procedure for proxy voting by banks is somewhat modified. First, banks are held
to point out alternative proxy agents to depositors of shares. Second, banks have to reveal board
membership and equity ownership in the affected corporation when soliciting proxy votes. Third,
banks must no longer exercise proxy votes when they own more than 5% of the firm’s equity
themselves, unless they receive specific voting instructions. While this provision seems counter-
intuitive from an agency perspective, it is intended to reduce control leverage. Its practical
consequences will be marginal, since this requirement primarily changes the layout of the forms
used to solicit proxy votes. Finally, independently of their organizational form, all banks have to
publish all board memberships held by employees and all equity stakes exceeding 5%.
In sum, the new provisions by the KonTraG provide minor changes towards more
transparency and less control leverage to banks. To what extent these provisions change real voting
behavior and reporting practice remains to be seen. In this study, we do not consider the new
provisions because they do not affect the sample. In addition to the KonTraG, some other provisions
exist that specify particular requirements for listed securities. In the following paragraphs, we
describe the rules for listing equity shares on each of the market segments.
2.4.1.2 Amtlicher Handel (official market)
The issuer, together with a credit institution that has a seat on a German exchange, can apply
for listing.30 For their own listing, credit institutions do not need another institution to accompany
its listing. It is mandatory to publish a prospectus31 and an interim financial report during the fiscal
year.32 For an initial listing, the expected market value of the listed shares must generally exceed
DM 2.5 Mio. and at least 25% of the issue must be widely held, but the exchange may admit smaller
issues or a lower percentage widely held if it anticipates a sufficiently deep market.33 It is further
required that the issuer have existed for at least three years, unless the issue is expected to be in the
interest of the issuer and the public.34
The prospectus must contain detailed information on the securities to be listed and its
contents are comparable to SEC form S-1. In addition to basic information on the issuer and price,
size, and cost of the issue, it must contain all potential restrictions on transfers and the procedure for
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future seasoned issues of the same security.35 The issuer must also publish the nature and result of
potential tender offers or exchange offers pertaining to the security during the year before listing.36
With respect to control over the issuer, the prospectus must contain a listing of all shareholders
owning 5% or more of capital or votes, all shares held by management and board, and other persons
or companies that have a controlling influence on the issuing firm.37 Interim financial reports must
contain basic information on the issuer, sales, and profits following the requirements for regular
annual reports.38
2.4.1.3 Geregelter Markt (regulated market)
The issuer, together with a credit institution that has a seat on a German exchange, can apply
for listing.39 For their own listing, credit institutions do not need another institution to accompany
its listing. The issuer has to publish a financial report at the time of the listing (as opposed to a more
detailed prospectus),40 but no additional reports during the fiscal year. On the other hand, in the case
of a first public offering the issuer must publish a prospectus.41 It must contain basic information on
issue and issuer and is less comprehensive than that required for official listings. It nevertheless
contains the items listed in the previous sections, except for shares held by management and
board.42
2.4.1.4 Other market segments
Listing requirements for all other market segments (Freiverkehr and Neuer Markt) are set up
by the exchanges and not governed by law. The only legal requirement is a prospectus (as described
in section 2.4.1.2) in the case of initial public offerings.43
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2.5 Regulation of banks and insurance companies
For regulatory purposes, German banking law distinguishes between three major types of
banks: credit institutions, financial institutions, and financial holdings. § 1 KWG defines activities
that are considered banking activities and labels a company a credit institution (Kreditinstitut), if it
performs banking functions such as taking deposits, extending loans, and securities brokerage. If a
company is not a credit institution, but its main business is, for example, to purchase stakes in other
firms, factoring, leasing, credit cards, securities trading, or other investment banking activities, it is
labeled a financial institution (Finanzinstitut). Finally, a financial holding (Finanzholding) is a
financial institution whose subsidiaries are primarily financial or credit institutions, where at least
one subsidiary is a credit institution. Only credit institutions, and by implication financial holdings,
are regulated by the supervisory authorities (Deutsche Bundesbank and Bundesaufsichtsamt für das
Kreditwesen). For the sake of brevity, in the following we will use „bank” as a synonym for both
credit institutions and financial holdings.
Banks can be organized in any legal form except as sole proprietorships.44 Private insurance
companies may be organized as Aktiengesellschaften or as Versicherungsverein auf Gegenseitigkeit
(mutual companies).45 The supervisory authorities must license all banks and insurance companies.
The ownership of stakes in non-banking and non-insurance firms is not heavily restricted.
There is no general limit on stakes held by insurance companies (except for very rigorous
restrictions on the assets of life insurers). Banks may not hold more than 15% of their own equity as
long-term investments in any unrelated firm, and not more than 60% of their capital for all such
investments together.46
Both banks and insurance companies face extensive ownership-disclosure requirements for
their owners and for stakes in other firms. All such filings go to the respective supervisory
authorities and are confidential.47 Public disclosure requirements are governed by the rules on the
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respective legal form. Only mutual insurance companies, which are a variant of the Verein (union),
face stricter requirements with respect to their financial reporting, compared to other unions.48
2.6 Regulation of investment companies
The most important type of investment company is the Kapitalanlagegesellschaft (KAG), a
special type of credit institution and as such subject to banking regulation.49 KAGs may set up
public funds and special funds. The latter faces less rigorous publication requirements, but may
have at most 10 investors whose certificates cannot be transferred without consent of the KAG.
Admissible legal forms are the AG and the GmbH.50 AGs must issue registered shares and their
transfer is subject to the approval of the management board.51 In contrast to U.S.-type fund-
management companies, KAGs must separate their own assets from investor’s assets (investors
receive certificates and not shares of common stock). Every six months KAGs have to publish a
detailed list of the assets of each of their funds.
Another type of investment company is the Unternehmensbeteiligungsgesellschaft (UBG).
The investment of KAGs in non-listed shares is restricted to 10% of each fund, or up to 30% as
„stille Beteiligung” if the fund’s stated purpose is to invest in such firms.52 In contrast, UBGs
exclusively invest in such „quiet stakes” and unlisted securities. UBGs are not considered credit
institutions and are supervised by regional (state) authorities. The mandatory legal form is the AG
with a minimum capital of DM 2 Mio. Within 10 years of incorporation, 70% of the equity must be
officially listed and offered to the public.53 The major distinction to KAGs is that UBGs do not
manage funds that issue certificates to investors, but rather hold investments as their own assets.
Until they go public, UBGs do not have to disclose a list of their investments. At the time of
the IPO, a company report must identify all stakes held via securities, but not those held via quiet
stakes.54 In contrast to stakes held by KAGs, those held by UBGs remain mostly anonymous. In
                                                
48 § 16 VAG subjects mutuals to most of the commercial code, HGB; §§ 341 - 341o govern issues specific to insurance companies in
general.
49 § 2 KAGG. One difference to banks is the minimum capital of DM 5 Mio. (§ 2 II KAGG), as opposed to ECU 5 Mio for credit
institutions.
50 § 1 III KAGG.
51 § 1 V KAGG, GmbH statutes can deviate from this rule.
52 § 8 II, § 25b I-III KAGG.
53 § 2 I, §§ 9, 10 I UBGG.
54 §§ 11 and 12 I, II UBGG.22
their annual reports, only the number of stakes held and changes during the year have to be
presented.55
3 Estimating the relative importance of legal forms
Table 12 to Table 14 provide descriptive statistics on the number of firms in the various
industries by legal form. While no complete survey of companies exists, both the Bundesbank and
the German Statistical Office periodically publish summary information on companies reporting to
them. The Bundesbank obtains balance sheets from all firms issuing bills of exchange, the statistical
office from all firms filing tax returns. Both consider individual-firm annual reports as opposed to
consolidated accounts.
3.1 The number of firms in Germany
Table 12 shows the number of manufacturing and trading companies grouped by industry,
sales, and a crude categorization of legal form. The latter is split into incorporated firms, not
incorporated firms, and sole proprietorships. The table reveals that incorporated firms cover the
largest and the smallest firms, in terms of sales, in most industries. It is often alleged that most of
the smallest limited liability firms are GmbHs, while most of the largest companies are AGs.
Unlimited liability firms cover the medium size class in most industries.
The data from the Statistical Office is summarized in Table 13 and Table 14. The former
presents a rough estimate of the relative aggregate taxable value of each legal form (the basis for
property taxes), the latter of taxable sales additionally grouped by actual sales. The taxable value
estimated in Table 13 is highly correlated with total asset value and represents a measure available
for most firms. The most important legal forms are the AG and the GmbH, each representing almost
one third of economy-wide value. The average AG is about 120 times larger than the average
GmbH. Of similar importance are the unlimited-liability forms OHG and KG together. Their
average size is about twice that of GmbHs.
Table 14 contains related information, but is in terms of those sales on which value-added
tax is based. It shows that for AGs, 98% of taxable sales come from firms where regular sales
exceed DM 100 Mio. In contrast, the corresponding figure is 42.5% for GmbHs, 43.4% for OHGs,
and 50% for KGs.
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To conclude, the most important limited-liability forms in Germany are the AG and the
GmbH, and the most important unlimited-liability forms are the OHG and the KG. All remaining
legal forms, including sole proprietorships, have relatively little economic importance taken
together.
3.2 The number of banks and insurance companies in Germany
Table 15 shows the number of banks and their aggregate assets. The most important types of
banks, in terms of total assets, are private credit banks. They account for about 24% of total bank
assets in Germany, closely followed by state savings banks (20%) and state banks (18%). Similar
information on insurance companies is listed in Table 16, showing aggregate gross premia across
different insurance types. Data on banks and insurance firms separated by legal form is not
available.
4 The German transposition of the EU Transparency Directive
4.1 Background56
In Germany, the Transparency Directive (88/627/EEC) was transposed as part of a security
trading law (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, WpHG, BGBL July 30, 1994, I S. 1749ff) that contains a
series of measures that are intended to strengthen Germany’s financial markets.57 In addition to
transposing the Transparency Directive, the WpHG provides the legal basis for creating a securities
trading commission (Bundesaufsichtsamt für den Wertpapierhandel, BAWe). The BAWe formally
addresses regulations and penalties relating to insider trading, the real-time publication of price-
relevant information (ad-hoc Publizität), and the rules for operating securities houses.
The WpHG was passed on July 26, 1994 and some sections became effective on August 1,
1994. The Transparency Directive was supposed to have been transposed by January 1, 1991.58 The
sections that transposed the directive became effective on January 1, 1995. The BAWe, the
„competent authority“ referred to in the Transparency Directive, started its operations on the same
day.
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The transposition of the directive marks a distinct change in the definition of „markets“ and
the attitude towards listed corporations by German politicians, industrialists, and the financial
community. For example, before July 30, 1994 there was no effective legislative difference in the
disclosure requirements of listed and non-listed corporations. Although German law makes a
number of provisions for the disclosure of ownership information and German cartel and business
group law imposes disclosure requirements for control, the issues of ownership and control have
traditionally been regarded as private, sensitive, and not for the eyes of the general public. Even in
the current discussion, ownership and control information is rarely regarded as share-price relevant.
Many owners of listed and non-listed firms prefer to remain anonymous and their mentality is
captured more accurately by the French name for Aktiengesellschaft - Societé Anonyme. The debate
surrounding the passage of the WpHG reflects this clash of cultures and may be one of the main
reasons why Germany was so late in transposing the Transparency Directive. As we shall document
in this section, much of the old mentality survives. The current regulation is a good start insufficient
to make control over corporate Germany transparent.
The BAWe is executing the law and bound by its content, the associated annotations and,
eventually, the decisions of the courts. We stress this fact because the BAWe does not have the
power to enhance transparency beyond the limits imposed by the German transposition of the
Transparency Directive and the official implementation guidelines. It statute and powers are much
more limited than those of other regulators, for example the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC).
Although § 29 II WpHG gives the BAWe the mandate to draft practical guidelines, the
freedom of the BAWe in choosing the contents of these guidelines is limited. For example, the law
or its annotations do not require business groups holding a block to provide a transparent view of
their organization. Hence, the BAWe does not have the power to require blockholders to submit
supplemental information such as an organizational chart. However, these are political and
administrative legal questions that go beyond the scope of this paper. It remains a fact that
transparency in Germany is lacking when compared to other countries, regulators, and markets.
4.2 The mechanics of the notification process
The mechanics of the notification process are simple and closely follow the Transparency
Directive. Figure 1 illustrates the notification process. The main features of the transposition and the
Directive are:
1. the filings are made and published on paper;25
2. the shareholder notifies the company and the company notifies (and pays for notifying) the
market;
3. notifications can take up to 16 days to reach the market.
The system is not very practical, too slow, and too expensive. It puts the company under
considerable stress to publish the information within 9 calendar days and does not ensure the rapid
dissemination of the information. A maximum of 16 days (a maximum of 7 days for the shareholder
to notify the company and a maximum for 9 days for publication) can pass between someone
crossing the threshold and the moment the information reaches the market. Before reaching the
market, the information has passed through many hands and, if it is price relevant, could easily be
used for illegal insider trades. Indeed, the shareholder could have crossed other thresholds during
the notification period and, by the time the original notification reaches the market, the information
could be out of date already. Since this unacceptable delay has been implemented by the
transposition of the EU directive, a revision of the law would be required to modify current
procedures.
It is not clear where to look for the information either. If the company is listed on a German
official market, the company has to publish a notification in a German newspaper that has been
awarded the privilege of publishing such notifications by the relevant German stock exchange(s). At
the same time, the company has to publish a note in the official newspaper of the Federal
Government (Bundesanzeiger), indicating in which newspaper(s) the notification is published. The
Bundesanzeiger has a very low circulation (approximately 15,000) and as one commentator
observed „the Bundesanzeiger is not usually read for breakfast.“ Additionally, the information may
actually have been published in the relevant newspaper before the Bundesanzeiger publishes the
reference. Most recently, the Bundesanzeiger requirement has been scrapped. However, it has not
yet been replaced with a more efficient, cumulative pointer to the original notifications.
Since 1997, the BAWe publishes the reference to the notifications that were used to compile
its new bi-monthly publications via its internet site (http://www.bawe.de). If the BAWe would
decide to publish the original notifications that it receives, transparency would be enhanced
considerably by providing full information within a potentially much shorter time span. However, in
1996 the BAWe had been allocated only five and a half positions for handling all matters relating to
voting-block notifications (for roughly 430 companies on the official market) and the ad-hoc
notifications (for over 600 companies on the official and second-tier market). Therefore, given the26
current resource allocation by the German parliament, it is unlikely that such an improvement is
within reach.
Since the number of steps involved is large, the notification process is costly and prone to
errors. In comparison to the United States or Canada, where all filings are made via EDGAR
(Electronic Data Gathering Analysis and Retrieval) and SEDAR (System for Electronic Document
Analysis and Retrieval),59 the German notification system appears rather antiquated and in stark
contrast to repeated claims that Europe is moving towards an „information society.” It is not in the
power of the BAWe to change this situation and the shortcomings of the notification process have
their origin in the Transparency Directive, which the German legislation followed very closely.
However, the German transposition did not use the possibility of imposing stricter conditions or to
provide sufficient resources, which the Directive clearly allows for, to significantly improve the
whole process. We did not investigate the German government’s position in the negotiations in
Council leading up to the acceptance of the final text of the Transparency Directive. However,
Schneider (1995) reports that the German government blocked certain transparency enhancing
measures at the proposal stage and/or in Council.
4.3 Who has to report voting stakes?
§ 21 WpHG (notifications of direct shareholdings), § 22 (notifications of shares „attributed“
to a shareholder because he or she controls the way the shares are voted) and § 41 (first time
notification since the law came into force) are the legal „triggers“ for the notification process.
• § 21 states that someone crossing 5%, 10%, 25%, 50% or 75% (through purchase, sale or other
means) of the votes of a German company listed on an official EU market has to notify according
to the mechanisms set out in section 4.2. The requirement does not depend on the share of voting
capital controlled but the fraction of the total votes controlled. Voting caps (Höchststimmrechte)
are not taken into account when computing the percentages (Nottmeier and Schäfer 1997, page
91).
• § 22 is the most complicated piece of the legislation and sets out the rules for „multi-layer“
control of voting shares. It defines which indirectly controlled votes are „attributed“ to a
shareholder. Much of this section will concentrate on providing examples of the provisions of §
22 and documenting its limitations. It will be shown that the current version of §22 is inadequate
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for providing real transparency on who exerts considerable voting power in German listed
companies.
• § 24 states that the parent of a business group that prepares consolidated accounts can make
notifications for itself and/or other companies in the business group. The parent’s notification
must report the name of the subsidiary and all other details that would have to be published had
the subsidiary notified itself, but only if the subsidiary has passed a notification threshold
individually.
• § 41 is the first-time notification rule that provides the starting stock from which, through tracing
changes, future „snapshots“ of the ownership structure of the voting stock can be constructed. It
states that, unless a notification according to § 21 has already been made before the first general
meeting in 1995, shareholders have to report holdings above 5%. The provisions of § 22 also
apply to first-time notifications.
4.4 Transparency and the WpHG
Although the provisions of these articles appear rather straightforward, a number of
complications arise. Since the provisions of the WpHG are legally uncharted territories in Germany,
the annotations (Gesetzesbegründung) to the WpHG are binding and there are few court rulings to
date.60 Practical issues that arise from the day-to-day implementation of the WpHG are discussed in
Nottmeier and Schäfer (1997) and strongly lean on the annotations to the WpHG in Schneider
(1995) and Kümpel and Ott (1995). The authors are the responsible for the implementation of the
German transposition of the Transparency Directive at the BAWe.61
4.4.1 Banks’ proxy votes are not reported
The German government, in its annotations (Gesetzesbegründung) to the WpHG, decided
that banks have not to report proxy votes (the well-known and much discussed Auftragsstimmrecht
mechanism). This decision is justified by the fact that §135 V and §128 II AktG force banks to
consult shareholders, make a voting proposal and, unless the shareholder instructs them otherwise,
                                                
60 The Gesetzesbegründung was published in the Bundestagsdrucksache 12/6679.
61 Although their contribution is not legally binding and the authors stress that it reflects their personal views and not those of the
BAWe, it is an account of the de facto interpretation and implementation of the WpHG text, legal guidelines issued by the
government with the law, the interaction between the provisions of the WpHG, and other legal texts and opinions.28
are afterwards bound by their proposal (Bundestagsdrucksache 12/6679, page 54). Since the banks
must stick with their original proposal, it is argued that the votes should not be attributed to the
banks because legally it is not under their discretion to decide how the shares are voted. Although
there are no precise figures on how many bank customers actually take advantage of the possibility
to instruct their bank, it is alleged that very few customers do. In practice, there is no difference
between „free to propose how to vote and not be challenged“ and „free to vote.“ Hence, if the spirit
of the Transparency Directive were to be applied rigorously, a notification should be required and
the banks would have to notify the shares for which they have received no explicit voting
instructions. Alternatively, they could be forced to declare on whose behalf they vote the shares. The
limitation this notification exemption imposes on the available voting-power data is discussed in
section 4.6.5. Even if the BAWe were to disagree with the treatment of proxy voting by banks
prescribed by the government, it has to tolerate the resulting opaqueness.
4.4.2 Votes of investment companies are not attributed to any party
While limited reporting requirements apply to Kapitalanlagegesellschaften (investment
funds), they affect neither their owners nor the holders of investment certificates.62 One would
expect that the funds invested by investment companies be either controlled by the owners of the
investment company or the investors who deposited the funds with the company. In practice, the
voting stock is attributed to neither group. § 10 Ia explicitly exempts votes owned by KAGs from
the requirements of § 22 WpHG. Controlling owners of the investment companies do not have to
notify because it is alleged that the managers of the investment fund act in the best interest of their
clients. Holders of certificates do not have to notify because they do not exert control themselves.
Hence, in practice Kapitalanlagegesellschaften play the role of making controlling ownership
anonymous. To provide equal treatment to all investment companies, the equivalent of
Kapitalanlagegesellschaften from other member states may soon benefit from this ‘opaqueness
4.4.3 Votes are not always attributed to their de facto owners
When the shareholder of the listed company is not an individual but a company, a voting
trust, a family pool, etc., votes controlled by this company should be attributed to its owners. The
interpretation of the relevant §21 and §22 allows for too many exceptions and very often, the
                                                
62 § 10 Ia 3 KAGG specifies the limitation to § 21 WpHG that voting control less than 10% deriving from a fund controlled by the
KAG does not have to be reported. This contrasts to the general 5% minimum for other entities.29
notification requirement does not extend beyond the shareholder company. For example, Nottmeier
and Schäfer (1997, page 93) argue that shares held by non-listed firms only have to be attributed to
their owner if he controls that firm. This judgement is based on the WpHG §22 III where „control“
is clearly defined and therefore Nottmeier and Schäfer argue that other definitions of „control“
found in German or European law are not applicable. This limitation opens the opportunity to hide
controlling stakes by dispersing votes over a number of small intermediate holding companies. For
example, shares held by unlisted firms with two 50%-owners are never attributed beyond the level
of the unlisted firm, because none of the owners is deemed to be „controlling” in these cases. Thus,
if two individuals control 100% of a listed corporation via two unlisted holding companies, of
which each individual owns 50%, they jointly have full control over the listed firm but do not have
to notify it.
The number of possible combinations between the type of direct shareholders of a listed
company on the one hand, and the type of institution (or individual) who controls the shareholding
company and the control mechanism (ownership link, power of attorney, proxy voting, control
contract) on the other, is very large. Hence, the debate of who has to notify beyond „the first level“
is likely to keep courts and regulators busy. Whether more transparency will result from potential
refinements or whether a fundamental redesign of the disclosure procedure is required remains to be
seen.
4.5 Data
The analysis below is based on data from BAWe (1996), the first-ever official cross-
sectional „snapshot“ of the distribution of voting blocks in Germany on September 30, 1996. It
contains the cumulative result of all notifications up to this date according to §§ 21, 22, and 41
WpHG since January 1, 1995. By year-end 1996, 436 firms trade in the official market segments in
Germany. All of these firms should have declared any blockholders controlling 5% or more by early
1996. The BAWe (1996) report, however, includes only 402 German companies.63 Therefore, 34
companies or 7.6% of all officially listed firms had not received any notifications or had failed to
report them since the WpHG came into force. To obtain a more complete data set, we investigate
the missing firms.
First, Deutsche Telekom went public in October 1996 and was not traded in September.
Additional 17 firms were included in later versions of the BAWe report, although several of their
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filings had been made before September 1996. For another 11 firms, we find ownership information
in Hoppenstedt’s Konzernstruktur-Datenbank (KSD).64 For six firms (Bremer Vulkan, Georg, Arn.,
Marschollek Lautenschl. und Partner AG, Terrex Handels-AG, Traub AG, and Würzburger Hofbräu
AG we were not able to find any reliable information and excluded them from the analysis below.
The final sample includes 430 firms and consists of the original 402 from BAWe (1996), 17 from
BAWe (1997), and 11 from KSD. For all firms we crosschecked KSD and BAWe data to eliminate
errors and to confirm reported figures. We also discarded all stakes below 5% that are included in
BAWe (1996) but not attributed to some other controlling party. These filings are not required by
law and are most likely erroneous notifications.
4.6 Notification problems
In this section, we first describe the contents of transparency filings. Then we present some
case examples of the shortcomings of the current reporting practice. Each of the latter examples
represents issues that deserve attention in future refinements of the legal requirements and the
reporting practice if transparency is to be achieved.
4.6.1 Example of an original notification
In December 1996 we asked all 435 officially listed German companies to support this
project by furnishing annual reports, company statutes, AGM voting lists, and control notifications
for the past two fiscal years, all of which are publicly accessible documents. RWE AG is one of the
companies that responded and that has supplied us with copies of the four notifications it received
during 1996. The notification by Allianz AG Holding is of particular interest, because it illustrates
three important aspects of the German notification process.
                                                
64 KSD contains mostly ownership information, and not the type of voting power information that is used in this analysis. The eleven
firms we found on KSD are the following: Amira Verwaltungs AG, Commerzbank AG, Custodia Holding, Garant Schuh AG, IWKA
Industrie-Werke Karlsruhe Augsburg AG, Leica Camera, Mannesmann AG, Merck, MLF Holding AG, Quante AG, Westag &
Getalit AG. Out of those, Amira, Custodia, Leica, Merck, Quante, and Westag have substantial blockholdings (greater than 5%) that
were not reported to the BAWe by May 1998.31
RWE Aktiengesellschaft
Essen
Allianz Aktiengesellschaft Holding, Berlin and Munich, has notified us that, in connection with § 41 II and § 24
Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, its share of our voting capital as of 1 January 1995 was 8.117%.
In the share of voting capital, the attributable voting rights of  § 22  I Wertpapierhandelsgesetz were
No. 2 7.661%    and
No. 7 0.015%.
Essen, December 12, 1995 RWE Aktiengesellschaft
The Management
Source: Translation of a notification published in the Börsenzeitung No. 240 on December 14, 1995
RWE AG was notified by Allianz Aktiengesellschaft Holding about the RWE AG voting
block Allianz AG Holding commanded on January 1, 1995. The notification was made at the time
of Allianz AG Holding’s first annual meeting during 1995 (in October 1995) under the provisions
of  § 41 WpHG. Unlike in the case of notifications made on the basis of § 21 WpHG, RWE AG had
one month (§ 41 III WpHG) and nine days (§ 25 I WpHG) to publish the notification. It was printed
in the Börsenzeitung No. 240 on December 14, 1995. Allianz Aktiengesellschaft Holding notified as
the parent of a business group that publishes a consolidated annual account (§ 24 WpHG).
However, if Allianz AG Holding would report on behalf of a subsidiary, the name of the subsidiary
would have to be mentioned in the notification. Hence, in this case, we infer that Allianz AG
Holding is making the notification on its own behalf or on behalf of affiliated companies that,
individually, fall under the notification threshold.
The notification breaks down the „attributed“ shareholding into:
• No. 2: Shares owned by a company (or companies) that is (are) controlled by Allianz AG
Holding (7.661%).
• No. 7: Shares that have been deposited with Allianz AG Holding, but the depositor has not left
Allianz AG Holding with precise instructions for voting the shares (0.015%).
• The remaining 0.44% of RWE AG voting shares is a residual and we infer that Allianz AG
Holding directly owns them.
The BAWe has taken the data from the notifications and tabulated them. The entry for RWE
AG is reproduced in Table 17. While it would enhance transparency, the breakdown of the
„attribution reason“ is not published.32
The column „direct and attributed shares“ reports the total percentage of shares the notifying
company controls. The column „attributed“ shows how many of these shares are attributed. The
single-vote column refers to situations where a company owns 50% of the voting shares of a
company plus one „casting vote“ that gives majority control.
In the examples below, we calculate two additional numbers representing direct stakes and
voting blocks in the reporting listed firm. The columns „direct & attributed“ and „attributed“
correspond to the BAWe (1996) publication. To compute the total controlled by reporting
shareholders, we cannot simply sum the percentages in the column „direct and attributed“ to avoid
double counting of stakes. Therefore, we construct a „direct” column which may be aggregated to
determine total block ownership.65 „Direct“ is simply the difference between columns „direct and
attributed“ and „attributed.“ „Blocks“ is intended to show the existing individual ultimate voting
blocks, but we document below that based on BAWe data alone assigning ultimate blocks is often
an ambiguous inference. Small discrepancies between the sum of direct stakes and the sum of
assigned blocks can arise when small „attributed“ stakes are added to a direct shareholding but not
notified (do not appear in the direct column). Table 18 provides an example of such a case.66
4.6.2 What is lost from not knowing the attribution reason
In this section, we illustrate what is lost from not having electronic access to facsimiles of
the original notifications (as they are published in the newspapers). If the BAWe were provided with
the resources to create an archive with all published notifications, transparency would be enhanced
considerably. In each of the following three examples the original notifications would reveal the
true control structure, but the data published by the BAWe do not.
The first example is presented in Table 19, which shows the stakes held in AGIV AG. BHF
Bank clearly owns and controls a stake of 48.7%. Stock owns a stake of 10.01% directly, and EVS
indirectly controls a stake of the same size. The open question is whether this is the stake directly
                                                
65 The cross-section spreadsheets the BAWe publishes on the internet now also contain a „direct“ column.
66 Altogether there are about 50 such cases. In 25 cases the discrepancy between the sum of direct shareholdings and the sum of
block shareholdings is less than 5% and can be explained by attributions of stakes that are below the individual notification
threshold. In the remaining 25 cases the discrepancy between the sum of direct shareholdings and the sum of block shareholdings
was more than 5% (the notification threshold). The stakes were not reported for various reasons. For example: in the case of
Dyckerhoff AG there is a discrepancy of 11.6% (family pool) and in the case of Heidelberger Zement AG there is a discrepancy of
9.22% (attribution to a physical person). For Schering AG (7.2%) and Tarkett AG (7.2%), the discrepancy of the sum of direct stakes
and block stakes results from an „anonymous“ attribution to Allianz Holding AG. According to Hoppenstedt (1997), Villeroy and
Boch AG is actually controlled by a block of 100% in the hands of a family pool. The sum of direct stakes is 35.13% leading to the
largest discrepancy of 64.87%.33
owned by Stock or the sum of several smaller stakes that individually fall below the 5% threshold.
Therefore, additional information is necessary to investigate whether Stock is controlled by EVS.
A similar situation is presented in Table 20, where the ultimate controlling party cannot be
identified either. Two firms hold direct stakes in Rhenag AG: RWE Energie AG (54.09%) and
Thüga AG. While RWE Energie is likely to be controlled by RWE AG, it is not clear, whether
Preussen Elektra AG or Veba AG controls the Thüga stake of 40%. Only checking an additional
source of information, the appendix of the annual report of VEBA AG, reveals that it owns 100% of
the total capital of Preussen Elektra AG, 56.3% of the capital of Thüga AG and 41.3% of Rhenag
AG. Without this additional information, it is not possible to assign the ultimate voting block
properly to Veba AG.
In the case of Markt- und Kühlhallen AG, there are two direct stakes (Table 21). One is held
by Doblinger Industriebeteiligung KG (41.41%) and another of almost the same size held by BB-
Kapitalbeteiligungsgesellschaft mbH (41.40%). While Alfons Doblinger most likely controls Alfons
Doblinger Industriebeteiligung KG, it is not clear whether the BB stake is attributed to DIB or
constitutes a second block. Indeed, according to Markus (1996), BB-Kapitalbeteiligungsgesellschaft
mbH is owned by Bankgesellschaft Berlin AG (50%) and Gothaer Versicherung auf Gegenseitigkeit
(50%), and unrelated to Mr. Doblinger.
A more striking example is the case of Monachia AG (Table 22). Again, there are two
reported direct stakes. One is held by Allianz Holding AG (45.22%) and a second stake of the same
size is held by Hochtief AG (45.22%). Only the fact that no shares are attributed to Allianz AG and
Hochtief AG indicates that there are two blocks and not just one block with two attributions. Since
the total cannot exceed 100%, it follows that one of these stakes must have been attributed to RWE
AG. Again, the fact that RWE controls Hochtief must be obtained from other sources.
4.6.3 A large number of notifications is not always informative
In 56% of all cases, the reported control structure has one or two entries (Table 23). As we
show below, more entries per company do not necessarily provide more transparency under the
present reporting practice.
Table 24 shows the companies with 8 or more entries, most of which are formal family pools
or pools of heirs (Erbengemeinschaft). Only for formal pools and individual family members who
control more than 5% of the votes, the notification rules apply (illustrated in Table 26 below). The
reporting practice of foreign owners of German firms varies substantially. While owners based in34
the United States and the United Kingdom generally report the whole intermediate structure right
back to the controlling parent, other European companies are much less forthcoming. For example,
there are only two reported blockholders of Pirelli Deutschland AG (Deutsche Pirelli Reifen
Holding GmbH and Pirelli Tire Holding N. V.). The vast Italian superstructure that could have put
Pirelli at the top of Table 24 is missing.
Table 25 shows the reported voting blocks for Tarkett AG, one of the companies with the
largest number of entries. It is evident that, given the current reporting practice, the data taken from
such a detailed notification is not very helpful in reconstructing the control structures that lead back
to the companies that (according to Hoppenstedt 1997) have ultimate control: Goldman Sachs
Advisors, L. P. and Standard Chartered Bank.
4.6.4 Obscurity of family control
There are implicit notification exemptions for listed companies controlled by families. No
exceptions are made for family pools that are tied by formal contractual arrangements (like the
Porsche pool and the Schwarz heirs in Table 24), even when they contain the clause that the pool
contract is not always binding. In these cases the names of all pool members must be reported to the
BAWe, but only the total voting block of the pool, the name of the head of the pool and the names
of the individual members commanding more than 5% of the voting stock are published (Nottmeier
and Schäfer 1997, page 94). Whenever no formal pool contract exists, control by families does not
become transparent.
Table 26 shows that two members of the Herlitz family reported a voting stake in Herlitz
AG. The direct holdings of Dr. Klaus Herlitz are under the 5% threshold but he votes 1.52% of,
potentially, another family member’s shares. This information contrasts with Hoppenstedt (1997)
which reports that 32 family members jointly control more than 50% of the voting stock. The stakes
of the non-reporting 30 family member are not considered „attributable“ if they have not entered a
formal voting contract or placed their shares in a formal family holding. In the case of Herlitz AG
this is obviously not the case and 30 of the 32 family members do not notify. The capital of Herlitz
AG consists of 51.3% voting stock and 46.9% nonvoting stock, making it a corporation tightly
controlled by a family. Judging from the notification information alone, Herlitz AG would be
misclassified as a widely held company.67
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4.6.5 Reported votes vs. exercised votes
VEBA AG was one of the companies that, in response to our December 1996 survey,
provided us with a copy of the attendance list of its annual meeting that took place on 23 May
1996.68 Table 27 reports the VEBA AG entry in BAWe (1996). It shows that Allianz AG Holding
controls 11.46% and Lambda Vermögensverwaltungsgesellschaft mbH 10.20% of VEBA AG’s
voting shares. Again, it is not obvious from the publication or the original filings whether the
Lambda votes are attributed to Allianz. They could have been attributed from various companies
controlled by Allianz each holding less than 5% and Lambda could be an independent company,
especially since BAWe data published later (September 15, 1997) reveals that the Allianz stake and
the Lambda stake were published on two different dates (Handelsblatt June 17, 1995 and April 29,
1996). Additional information is necessary to assign the voting blocks appropriately: the annual
report of Allianz AG Holding reveals that it owns (potentially indirectly) 70.5% of the total capital
of Lambda Vermögensverwaltungsgesellschaft mbH and 10.3% of the capital of VEBA AG.
The attendance list (summarized in Table 28) and a comparison to the VEBA AG entry in
BAWe (1996) reveals a number of interesting facts:
1. With the exception of Bankgesellschaft Berlin AG and a local savings bank, German banks did
not vote own equity at the VEBA AG meeting. Although Dresdner Bank AG alone voted 16.6%
of the total capital of VEBA AG and 33.3% of the capital that attended the meeting, Dresdner
Bank AG did not have to notify VEBA AG because these are proxy votes. What happens when,
say, Dresdner Bank AG votes shares Deutsche Bank has deposited for safekeeping (and vice-
versa) is unclear.
2. Investment companies (Kapitalanlagegesellschaften), most of them belonging to banks, voted
capital they have under administration without reporting a link to the controlling financial
institution or potentially controlling investor.
3. Less than half of the voting capital attended the annual meeting (49.96%). Since VEBA AG has
only issued one class of voting shares, this is equivalent to less than 50% of total capital. The
example shows the well documented fact that there is a big difference between the total number
of shares an individual or company owns and the voting power of this stake at an annual meeting
                                                                                                                                                                 
control 45.95% of Villeroy und Boch AG, but Hoppenstedt (1997) reports that 100% of the voting stock (plus part of the nonvoting
stock) is owned by the family.
68 VEBA AG also prepares accounts according to US-GAAP; its 1996 annual report contains S&P and Moody’s credit ratings and a
pledge to improve its investor relations further. From the format of the annual report and the positive response to our mailing we
conclude that VEBA AG is one of the few German corporations that takes an „investor-friendly“ attitude.36
with a low attendance rate. Indeed, if shareholder dispersion and attendance rates are inversely
correlated, the leverage effect for voting blocks that attend the meeting is high when dispersion is
high.
4. Allianz AG Holding has reported to control 11.46% of the VEBA AG capital (see Table 27).
This corresponds to DM 279,726,647 of VEBA AG’s equity capital. Allianz is „visibly“
represented at the meeting through Allianz Kapitalanlagegesellschaft, voting 0.11% of VEBA’s
shares. According to Markus (1996), Allianz Kapitalanlagegesellschaft has two owners: Allianz
AG Holding (75.1%) and Allianz Lebensversicherungs AG (24.9%). Lambda
Vermögensverwaltungsgesellschaft mbH does not appear at the meeting, although it reported to
control 10.2% of the voting capital of VEBA AG directly. One explanation we have is that
Allianz AG has deposited its shares with a bank (and instructs the bank how to vote) or has it
under management by a related investment company.
5. The composition of the supervisory board is consistent with the major voting blocks. On 23 May
1996, the chairman of the supervisory board was Hermann Josef Strenger, chairman of the
supervisory board of Bayer AG, Leverkusen (Allianz AG reported to control 5% of Bayer AG).
Allianz AG is represented by its CEO Dr. Henning Schulte-Noelle. Dresdner Bank AG is
represented by the managing board member Dr. Bernd Voss. Deutsche Bank AG is represented
by its then-CEO Hilmar Kopper.
The VEBA example shows that neither the attendance list nor the notifications made based
on the WpHG provide clarification about who controls VEBA AG. The BAWe publication
legislation reveals the 11.46% interest of Allianz AG. The attendance list is more informative
because we can identify Kapitalanlagegesellschaften (with 8.9% of the total vote and 17.8% of the
effective vote) that attend the meeting even when they own or manage less than 10% of the total
share capital, and identify banks’ proxy votes. It remains unclear, however, who controls the shares
voted by banks. Neither source reveals how Allianz AG exerts its influence.
4.6.6 Hidden group structures
It is often not possible to trace ultimate ownership because holding companies disguise
ultimate ownership. Table 29, for example, shows a single reported stake in DEPFA AG. The
shareholder, DEPFA Holding Verwaltungsgesellschaft mbH, disguises a whole shareholding
superstructure as illustrated in Figure 2. The reason is that this holding company has no majority
shareholder and hence DEPFA AG’s voting power is not attributed to any of the holding’s37
shareholders. In such cases, the German transposition of the Transparency Directive provides no
transparency at all.
5 Summary Statistics
In this section, we present descriptive statistics on the concentration of voting power in
Germany. The structure of the data set and disclosure problems were discussed in the previous
section. The dataset contains 430 companies; nearly all German companies listed on the official
market. We provide statistics for ultimate voting blocks (the sum of direct and attributed  stakes) by
company and by blockholder. We do not report statistics for direct stakes because they provide little
additional information on the control structure.
5.1 Summary statistics for individual companies
This section investigates the distribution of voting power across the 430 companies in the
dataset. There are three main results:
• voting power is highly concentrated,
• in most cases voting power is concentrated in one large block, and
• the blocks are likely to be held for control purposes.
Table 30 presents the empirical distribution and summary statistics for voting blocks. The
mean of the largest block (C1) is 58.9%. When there are other blocks, they do not add much voting
power. Adding the second and third largest voting block increases the mean concentration ratio by
only 9.8%. At the lower end of the block size distribution, only 17.7% of each company’s largest
voting block are smaller than 25% (the maximum percentage of voting rights needed to block
statute changes). At the top end of the distribution, 21% of the largest voting blocks exceed 90%.
Figure 3 corroborates the observation that most firms are dominated by one single shareholder. The
average size of the largest blocks (49.9%) exceeds that of the second largest blocks (2.6%) by a
factor of about 19. Moreover, only 20% of all listed firms have more than two registered
blockholders (Table 31). In sum, these results confirm the general view that control is highly
concentrated in Germany.
Figure 4 and Figure 5 show that blocks are used for control purposes. In Figure 4, we plot
the size of voting blocks against their cumulative frequency in the sample. The graph reveals that
25% of the sample firms have voting blocks exceeding 85%. Only another 25% of the sample have
voting blocks smaller than 25% of the voting rights. More interestingly, the voting blocks are38
clustered at 25%, 50%, and 75%. The same conclusion is illustrated in Figure 5, presenting a
histogram of voting block sizes. These „steps“ correspond to the blocking minority (that can be used
to block statute changes), a simple majority, and a supermajority. Since the supermajority can be set
higher than 75% in the company statute, voting blocks of less than 25% could also represent a
blocking majority. The figures suggest that block sizes are carefully chosen and control is an
important issue for blockholders.
5.2 Summary statistics for blockholders
This section investigates the distribution of voting power over blockholders. The dataset
contains 755 voting blocks held by 514 blockholders. We obtain four main results:
• Deutsche Bank and Allianz hold the largest number of blocks,
• most blockholders hold a single block,
• individuals hold the largest number of blocks as a group, and
• industrial firms hold almost as many, but larger blocks.
Table 32 lists all blockholders controlling more than three blocks. Deutsche Bank holds 27
blocks, Allianz holds 25 blocks, and VIAG AG, Dresdner Bank, and Munich Re hold 14 blocks
each. However, since Allianz, Munich Re and Dresdner Bank are closely linked (see Becht and
Boehmer 1999), Allianz and Munich Re are at the top of the blockholder league table - at least in
terms of the number of blocks held. There are also differences in the average size of controlled
blocks (see Boehmer 1999b for illustrative calculations of the value of controlled blocks). Table 33
shows that holding many blocks is the exception; 85% of all registered ultimate shareholders control
just one voting block.
Table 34 reports the number of blocks held by various blockholder types and the average
percentage of voting rights controlled.69 Most blocks (207) are held by individuals and families,
followed by industrial firms (186) and banks (116). The median size of the blocks held by industrial
firms is larger than for both individuals and banks. However, this measure is likely to misrepresent
economic importance, because family-controlled blocks tend to be of substantially lower value than
bank-controlled blocks (see Boehmer 1999b).
                                                
69 The category bank-related investment is not exhaustive. In this paper, we did not engage in the effort of determining the
ownership structure of all registered shareholders. Therefore, additional bank-controlled firms remain in the categories industrial
firm, holding, investment firm, and insurance firm.39
Figure 6 contains an alternative representation of the importance of different shareholder
types. The width of each rectangle is proportional to the number of blocks held and its height to the
range from the 25
th to the 75
th percentile. The central bar indicates the median, while individual
circles represent outliers (see Figure 6 for an exact description). Most notably, the 186 blocks held
by industry (code c) have a median close to 70% of the votes (of affected firms).
Holding companies control 59 blocks. In these cases, the BAWe filings do not reveal who
ultimately controls the voting rights. The reason is that attribution of control usually ends at the
level of the controlling firm, as opposed to extending to the controlling firm's owners. Especially
given the highly concentrated ownership structure in Germany, this appears to be a tremendous
obstacle to transparency.
6 Summary and conclusions
The German legal environment imposes explicit disclosure requirements for certain legal
forms, in particular for AGs. Pre-1995 rules include mandatory disclosure of annual reports and
stakes in other firms larger than 20%. After 1995, with the transposition of the EU Transparency
Directive, AGs listed in an official market also must disclose parties controlling more than 5% of
the voting rights. Since creditor protection is deeply rooted in German commercial law, the practical
efficacy of disclosure regulation is very low: the formation of groups involving less regulated legal
forms as intermediate layers can substantially reduce transparency. This argument is illustrated
using hypothetical examples and by documenting the deficiencies of the WpHG in providing
transparency.
We further show that few large firms accounting for the major chunk of the market’s
capitalization and trading volume dominate German capital markets. The concentration of control is
very high in the sense that 85% of all officially listed AGs have a dominant shareholder (controlling
more than 25% of the voting rights). Insider trading rules do not automatically discourage agents to
hold large voting blocks in German companies. Unlike in the United States, outside investors are
not automatically considered insiders (to have access to private, price sensitive information) when a
10% voting power threshold is passed.
In addition, there is little inside competition for control at the firm level: only very few listed
AGs have more than one large shareholder. Since there is no mandatory bid requirement like the
UK has instituted, and since there are few legal differences between listed and unlisted AGs, the
distribution of voting blocks is visibly driven by control thresholds derived from company law40
(25%, 50%, and 75%). The only potential counterweight results from the proxy-voting mechanism
that gives banks an important vote at AGMs, with all the inherent incentive problems of having a
creditor represent shareholders. The German proxy voting process separates ownership, often
completely, from control.
This exploratory study represents a first step towards explaining German corporate
governance and ends with several open questions. Future work is necessary to compare voting
power to ownership, measure the separation of ownership and control, determine the link between
the distribution of voting blocks and supervisory board representation, and contrast integrated
ownership (incorporating all ties between shareholders, not just majority links) to direct ownership.
Such work will ultimately allow an analysis of how these phenomena affect corporate performance
and other aspects of the German economy.41
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Table 1: Important legal forms of private companies














Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (GmbH) Yes 50

















GmbH (or AG) & Co. KG
13 Yes  50 1 1 Medium
Offene Handelsgesellschaft (OHG) No - 1 1 Medium




Gesellschaft bürgerlichen Rechts (GbR) No - 1 1 Low
Stille Gesellschaft
17 Yes
18 - - - Low




21 Not applicable - - - Low
Banks, any legal form except sole proprietorship Depends on legal form ECU 5 Mio.
22 Depends on legal form 2
23 Very high
                                                
1 § 7 AktG.
2 § 2 AktG.
3 § 76 I AktG.
4 § 5 I GmbHG.
5 § 1 GmbHG.
6 § 6 I GmbHG.
7 § 278 I AktG. General partners are referred to as Komplementäre, shareholders as Kommanditaktionäre.
8 § 7 AktG.
9 § 280 AktG.
10 § 76 I AktG.
11 § 161 I HGB. General partners are referred to as  , limited partners as Kommanditisten.
12 At least one general partner and at least one limited partner, § 161 I HGB.43
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
13 This represents a hybrid form where the general partner of a KG is a (limited-liability) GmbH. While the GmbH & Co KG is the most widely used hybrid form, the (unlimited-liability) general
partner may also be an AG, and the enclosing form may also be an OHG. If a GmbH or an AG is involved, all regulations affecting these forms still apply.
14 The e. G. is generally a limited-liability company (§ 2 GenG). Company statutes may deviate form this rule (§ 6 III GenG): In case of bankruptcy, members may be obligated to pay, in addition to
their initial investment, a limited or an unlimited amount to creditors.
15 § 4 GenG.
16 § 24 II GenG.
17 This is not a stand-alone organization, but rather a way to participate in any other organizational form.
18 § 232 II HGB.
19 § 56 BGB.
20 § 26 I BGB.
21 More precisely, this refers to „rechtsfähige Stiftungen bürgerlichen Rechts“ that operate a business.
22 § 33 I KWG, net of securities that have a cumulative preferential dividend.
23 § 33 IV KWG.44
Table 2: Definition of control over a company







Aktiengesellschaft, GmbH § 290 I: Firms within a group are controlled by a parent if they are led by the same parent
company and the parent has a long-term stake in these firms (exceeding 20%, § 271 I)
§ 290 II, qualifying the former: A parent always controls a subsidiary, if (i) it controls the
majority of votes, (ii) it has the right to appoint the majority of management or supervisory
board members AND controls votes, or (iii) exerts controlling influence via contractual
agreements or company statutes
1





report their stake to
the controlled firm
Aktiengesellschaft § 15: Affiliated firms are stand-alone entities that match one of the following criteria:
• a firm is majority controlled if the parent owns a majority of the capital or the majority
of the votes (§ 16 I)
• a firm is dependent on a parent if the latter can directly or indirectly exert controlling
influence or has majority control (§ 17)
• firms form a group (Konzern) if firms are under common leadership (§ 18)
• firms are mutually involved in each other if each owns at least 25% of the capital or the








All firms except AG, GmbH,
Genossenschaft, banks, insurance
companies matching at least two of
the following three criteria: (i) total
assets > DM 150 Mio., (ii) total
sales > DM 250 Mio., (iii) average
employment > 5000.
§ 1 V: all commercial activities of a single person form one undertaking, even if they are
conducted by more than one company






Aktiengesellschaft (AG) if listed in
an official market
§ 22: Voting rights are attributed to an entity if (excerpt):
• they are owned by a third party in the interest of the entity or a company controlled by
the entity
• they are owned by a company controlled by the entity
• they are owned by a third party but a contractual voting agreement exists with the entity
• the entity can purchase them by exercising an option
• they are deposited with the entity, and it can vote in its interest unless specific
instructions are given
345
Source of definition Aim of regulation Object of regulation Content of regulation




All firms • § 23 I: extends §§ 17, 18 AktG to all firms and further states that if several firms jointly
control another company, each of them is considered a controlling firm




Credit institutions in all legal forms § 1 VI, VII, and VIII: refer to § 290 HGB but extends the definition to all legal forms
§ 1 IX: A major stake exists if a company owns directly or indirectly at least 10% of the
capital or of the voting rights or if it holds any stake and can exert material control over
management
§ 10 II: A financial group exists if a bank owns at least 40% of a company that operates a
banking-related business
                                                
1 § 290 III, IV further qualify control by adding influence exerted by other subsidiaries of the parent company and subtracting influence exerted on behalf of third parties.
2 Mutually involved firms may exercise at most 25% of the votes in each other, unless one of the firms controls more than 50% of the other (§ 19 IV, § 328 AktG). In the latter case, all votes may
be exercised.
3 According to the BAWe and Schneider (1995), this does not include votes from shares deposited with banks.46
Table 3: Ownership information that must be provided with the annual financial statements
1
Rules requiring infor-
mation on stakes in




owners in the annual
accounts if the stake
owner is a company
Rules requiring infor-
mation on company
owners in the annual
accounts if the stake
owner is an individual
Availability of annual accounts to the
public
Aktiengesellschaft (AG) Stakes > 20%
2,3 Stakes > 25%
4 No Yes
5





Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien (KGaA) Stakes > 20%
2,3 Stakes > 25%
4 No Yes
5
Kommanditgesellschaft (KG) No No No Small: No; Large: Yes
GmbH (or AG) & Co. KG No No No Small: No; Large: Yes
Offene Handelsgesellschaft (OHG) No No No Small: No; Large: Yes
Eingetragene Genossenschaft (e. G.) Stakes > 20%
7 Stakes > 50%
8 No Yes
9
Gesellschaft bürgerlichen Rechts (GbR) No No No Small: No; Large: Yes
Stille Gesellschaft No No No No
Eingetragener Verein (e. V.) Small: No; Large:
Yes
10
No No Small: No; Large: Yes
Stiftung Small: No; Large:
Yes
10
No No Small: No; Large: Yes
Banks
11 Stakes > 20%
12 AG: stakes > 25%;





15 Stakes > 20%
16 AG: stakes > 25%;




                                                
1 The categorization „small“ and „large“ in the body of the table refers to companies regulated by the PublizitätsG. § 1 classifies a company as „large“ in this context if it meets two of the following
three criteria: (i) total assets exceed DM 125 Mio., (ii) Total sales exceed DM 250 Mio., (iii) average employment exceeds 5000 during the previous financial year.
2 § 285 XI HGB requires disclosure of the percentage stake in the target firm (if larger than 20% of the target capital), the targets nominal capital and its profit. § 286 III HGB exempts those stakes
from disclosure that either have a minor effect on presenting the financial status of the reporting firm or whose disclosure could harm one of the two firms. § 313 II HGB further regulates how
stakes are to be consolidated.
3 In addition, AGs must file all contractual arrangements that give them control over other firms with the company register (§§ 294 I, 298, 319 IV 327 III AktG).
4 § 160 VII, VIII AktG requires disclosure of all owners of more than 25% of its shares in the annual report, but only if the owner is a company. All such stakes have to be reported to the target
company by the stakeholder (§ 20 I, IV AktG) and be immediately published in a financial newspaper (§ 20 VI AktG). The reporting firm has to state whether the stake exceeds 25% or 50%, and47
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
whether the reporting firm also holds at least a 25% stake in the stakeholder. If such stakes are not reported, the owner cannot exercise voting rights associated with this stake. In principle, this
means that a stake can be bought secretly. In this paper, however, the issue is control over a company and control can only be exerted if the target company is notified. Thus, we can regard the
reporting requirement in § 20 AktG as binding for our purposes.
5 §§ 325-329 HGB.
6 § 40 I GmbHG. Information on owners must be published immediately (as opposed to annually) if all stakes are taken over by a single individual or company (§ 40 II GmbHG).
7 § 336 HGB, § 285 XI HGB.
8 § 336 HGB, § 285 XIV HGB. The majority owner must be named publicly if it includes the subsidiary in its consolidated annual report.
9 § 339 HGB.
10 § 5 II PublizitätsG, § 285 XI HGB.
11 As defined in § 340 HGB and §§ 1f  KWG.
12 § 340i HGB, § 311 HGB, § 285 XI HGB.
13 § 160 VII, VIII AktG, and § 340i HGB referring to § 285 XIV HGB, respectively. Also, see note 8.
14 § 340l I HGB.
15 As defined in § 341 HGB.
16 § 341i HGB, § 311 HGB, § 285 XI HGB.
17 § 160 VII,VIII AktG and § 341i HGB referring to § 285 XIV HGB, respectively. Also, see note 8.
18 § 341l I HGB.48
Table 4: Legal requirements on publishing ownership information





Deposit current list of
owners publicly
Restrictions on transfers of
ownership
Repurchase of own shares
Aktiengesellschaft (AG) Yes
1 Company register No
















11 Company register Company register, only
general partners
12,3,4
See AG for transfers of
limited shares. See OHG




13 No Company register
14 No transfers unless defined
in company statutes or
approved by all partners
15
Not applicable for general
partners, yes for limited
shares
16
GmbH (or AG) & Co. KG Yes Company register Company register
8,14 See GmbH for transfers of
GmbH shares and KG for
transfers of limited shares
See GmbH for GmbH
shares and KG for limited
shares
Offene Handelsgesellschaft (OHG) Yes
17 No Company register
18 No transfers unless defined
in company statutes or
approved by all partners
 19
Not applicable
Eingetragene Genossenschaft (e. G.) No







No No No No transfers unless defined
in statutes or approved by
all partners
Not applicable
Stille Gesellschaft No No No No transfers unless defined
in partnership contract or
approved by all partners
Not applicable
Eingetragener Verein (e. V.) Management
only
23
Register of  unions
24 No No transfers possible
25 Not applicable
Stiftung not applicable No not applicable Not applicable Not applicable49





Deposit current list of
owners publicly
Restrictions on transfers of
ownership




Insurance companies Company register AGs: see above
Mutuals: No
Yes,
28 also see AG No, see AG if organized as
AG
                                                
1 § 39f AktG. Among other things, firms must register nominal share capital as well as name, profession, and addresses of founders and of members of the first supervisory board.
2 There are two exceptions to this rule. First, an AG where all shares are owned by one person, the shareholder must register name, profession, and address (§ 42 AktG). Second, if a company owns
25% of the capital, or 25 or 50% of capital or votes in an AG, it must notify the AG (§ 20 I, IV AktG). The AG, in turn, must immediately publish this information in a financial newspaper (§ 20 VI
AktG). § 20 AktG, however, applies only to companies and not to individuals.
3 Owners who decide to vote personally at the AGM are publicly known, because § 129 I AktG requires that each shareholder present at the AGM is registered. This list is public and is later
deposited with the company register. De facto, however, the list does not provide informative knowledge about the owners of the AG, because proxy votes delegated to banks or other entities
cannot be traced back to the owner, even though the owner may have given explicit instructions on how to vote (§ 129 II, III AktG).
4 In addition, stake purchases leading to ownership crossing 25% or 50% must be filed immediately for approval by the BKartA, if the combined sales of buyer and target exceed DM 500 Mio. (§
23 GWB). These filings are generally publicly available if the acquisition is approved.
5 § 67f AktG. The company statutes may require approval by the management board, supervisory board, or general assembly.
6 § 71 AktG. The major exceptions include repurchases to avoid substantial and imminent damage to the company, to issue shares to employees, or to pay a consideration associated with a takeover
or similar transaction. All own holdings must be listed in the annual financial statements (§ 160 I, II AktG). Holdings of own shares must never exceed 10% of nominal capital. A further exception
applies to financial institutions that may repurchase, with approval of the AGM, up to 5% of their own shares for trading purposes. Repurchased shares lose all of their rights, including dividend
claims and voting rights.
7 § 8 GmbHG. Among other things, firms must register nominal capital as well as name, profession, and addresses of founders.
8 § 53f GmbHG.
9 § 15 GmbHG. The statutes may require approval by the company.
10 § 33 GmbHG. Repurchases are only allowed if nominal capital is fully paid in and the repurchase does not reduce nominal capital.
11 §§ 39f, 282 AktG. Requirements are the same as for AGs, except that the KGaA files the name of the general partners instead of those of the management board.
12 § 282f AktG.
13 §§ 106, 162 HGB. The filing includes the identity of general and limited partners and their individual shares in the firm's capital. Even though the required publication according to § 10 I HGB
(which requires the company register to publish records in the government newspaper) does not include the names of limited partners, these names can be obtained directly from the register.
14 §§ 107, 175 HGB.
15 §§ 131-144 HGB for changes in general partners; § 174, 175 HGB for changes in limited partners.
16 Absent other rules in the company statutes, the repurchase of limited shares (or other changes in limited partners or capital) requires approval by all partners (§ 174, 175 HGB).
17 § 106 HGB.
18 § 107 HGB.
19 §§ 131-144 HGB.
20 Only the members of the managing board must be published (§ 10 I GenG).
21 § 76 I GenG.
22 In the context of cooperatives, the repurchase of own shares amounts to terminating membership. The company has certain rights to expel members, which can be defined in the statutes (§ 68
GenG). Any member has the right to terminate membership, but has to adhere to certain waiting periods (§65 I, II GenG). Statutes can extent the waiting period up to five years, but cannot deny the50
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
termination right for members. In addition, membership can be terminated for other reason, such as bankruptcy of a member (§ 66 I GenG) or, under certain conditions, after a change in statutes (§
67a GenG).
23 § 64 BGB.
24 Refers to the Vereinsregister, § 59 BGB.
25 § 38 BGB.
26 As defined in § 340 HGB and §§ 1f KWG.
27 Several filing requirements exist for banks, which must provide information on their stakes in other companies and on their ownership to the Bundesamt für Kreditwesen and to the Deutsche
28 All stakes exceeding 10% of share capital for AGs or founding capital for mutuals must be approved by the BAV (§ 7a VAG).51
Table 5: Accessibility and availability of ownership data
Legal forms Accessibility of data Availability of data on computer
Company registers, registers of cooperatives
1 All Yes No
2
Market Supervision Authority (Bundesamt für den
Wertpapierhandel (BAWe), founded in 1996
AGs listed in an
official stock market
Annual publications of control rights exceeding
5%, but only a snapshot and no information on
changes
3
Only the data contained in annual
publications
Banking Supervision Authorities (Bundesaufsichtsamt
für Kreditwesen, Deutsche Bundesbank)
Financial institutions No
4 No
Insurance Companies Supervision Authority Insurance companies No
Competition Authorities (Bundeskartellamt, BKartA) All Monthly publications of takeover filings No
                                                
1 The register of cooperatives is held at the same courts that hold the company registers (§ 10 II GenG).
2 The company registers are administered in a decentralized way by local courts. Although § 8a HGB allows a computerized register, to our knowledge no court is using this option to date.
3 According to BAWe (1997), the office is planning disclosures that are more elaborate. The full text of publications on share-price relevant events as required by the insider regulation is already
available on several WWW sites.
4 The Bundesbank publishes aggregate figures of banking and other economic activity periodically, but does not provide data on individual institutions.52






























1 3 or 10 days










Since 1993: Stakes in
other firms exceeding
10% of their votes or
capital, or DM 100 Mio
market value and the





or special rules for listed
companies
None None None None None No
8 None
                                                
1 § 122 I AktG. Company statutes may specify a smaller percentage.
2 § 123 III, IV AktG. Company statutes may require that shareholders deposit their shares with a notary or a financial institution (under discretion of the shareholders) at least 10 days before the
AGM. Statutes may further require that shareholders register for the AGM at least three days before the meeting.
3 § 84 I AktG.
4 § 102 I AktG.
5 § 285 IX HGB. The aggregate must include all compensation and other benefits to board members that have accrued during the past financial year. Companies are exempt from this rule, if
publishing this information allows the public to identify compensation paid to a specific individual (§ 286 IV AktG).
6 § 131 AktG and KG, 26.8.93 - 2 W 6111/92, ZIP 1993, 1618. This ruling was the result of a successful suit of E. Wenger against Siemens AG. The court argues that since the EU Transparency
Directive requires disclosure of 10% stakes to the public, at least the same right should apply to shareholders of the firm. Thus, Schneider (1995) expects that after 1996, when the transposition of
the Transparency Directive becomes effective, stakes exceeding 5% must be disclosed to shareholders. According to Schneider, it is not clear, however, whether this only applies to stakes in listed
firms or to stakes in any firm. Schneider's argument that large owners must be disclosed upon request follows the same reasoning.
7 If executives violate their fiduciary duty according to § 93 AktG, they are generally personally liable for damages to the company. Shareholders representing at least 10% of capital can initiate
legal proceedings against executives.
8 § 17 WpHG explicitly specifies for AGs listed in an official market that data related to specific individuals must be deleted unless it is relevant to a currently prosecuted insider-trading violation.
In no instance must this information be published before publicly accessible court proceedings.53
Table 7: Proxy rules
Can company employees
exercise proxy votes?
Can banks exercise proxy
votes?











                                                
1 § 135 AktG. All proxy votes are exercised anonymously in the sense that the owner of the votes is not named publicly (§ 129 II, III AktG).54
Table 8: Important types of limited-liability equity securities
Type of share Issuing legal form Exchange listing Voting rights Requirements for new
issues
Stammaktie (common stock) AG, KGaA Possible Always, generally one per share 75% AGM vote
1
Vorzugsaktie (preferred stock) AG, KGaA Possible Generally no, unless the required cumulative preferential dividend
is not paid in two consecutive years, and in special matters of




Genußschein (participation right) All Possible No 75% AGM vote
4
Geschäftsanteil (cooperative share) e. G. No Generally one vote per member, independent of stake size
5 Membership request and
management approval
6
Geschäftsanteil (GmbH share) GmbH No Votes proportional to stake size
7 75% AGM vote
8
                                                
1 § 182 AktG. The company statutes may stipulate more or less restrictive requirements.
2 §§ 139-141. AGs may only issue shares without votes if they have a cumulative preferred dividend claim attached.
3 § 182 AktG. The company statutes may stipulate only requirements that are more restrictive. A different situation arises if a company has already preferred stock outstanding. It that case, old
preferred-stock holders must approve new preferred share with equal or better preference with a 75% majority (not adjustable by company statutes and in addition to the AGM approval) (§141 II,
III AktG). This additional vote is not required if further issues of preferred shares have been explicitly approved before the first preferred issue.
4 For AGs and KGaAs: § 221 AktG. The company statutes may stipulate more or less restrictive requirements. For all other forms, issuance generally requires 75% majorities.
5 § 43 III GenG. The statutes can grant a maximum of three more voting rights to specific members.
6 § 15 GenG. Increasing the share of existing members requires a 75% AGM majority (§ 16 II GenG).
7 § 47 II GmbHG.
8 A seasoned equity offering by a GmbH requires a change of statutes and thus a 75% majority (§§ 3 I, 53 II GmbHG).55
Table 9: Legal devices to leverage control relative to ownership in listed AGs
Device Current relevance Limitations Implications for transparency
Non-voting shares All AGs can issue two classes of stock Nominal value of non-voting shares
must not exceed that of voting shares
None: distribution of voting rights across classes of stock
published in annual report
Multiple-vote shares
1 Only relevant in a few formerly state-owned
firms
Illegal unless specifically approved by
state government
None: shareholders with multiple voting rights per share are
published in annual report
Voting caps
2 May be imposed by company statutes In practice easy to circumvent Reduces transparency: to circumvent caps, shareholdings
must be disguised by depositing them with friendly parties
Proxy Voting Possible in all AGs. Widely used by banks,
especially in listed companies with a
significant % of dispersed shareholdings
Voting instructions must be sought;
but usually no instructions are
provided
Reduces transparency significantly. It is not possible to
determine who owns the shares and who controls the votes
(the owner or the person voting the shares)
Large share blocks Widely used, weak minority protection
allows blockholders to pursue interests that
may not match that of other shareholders
Certain (legal) transfers from minority
shareholders require 75% AGM votes
None given the WpHG: voting blocks must be disclosed
Pyramids Widely used None except potentially higher
administrative costs
Reduces transparency: intermediate levels may legally hide
true ownership structure
Cross shareholdings Widely used Need at least three companies to
circumvent voting limitation
(see comment on pyramids)
Contractual control
arrangement
Widely used Requires 75% AGM vote None: must be published in annual report
Personal interlockings Widely used Needs supporting voting block at
AGM (blockholder, bank)
Reduces transparency: affiliation of supervisory board
members is often not obvious; often creditors without
shareholdings are represented who do not benefit from
providing transparency to (potential) shareholders
                                                
1 Multiple voting rights are illegal as of May 1
st, 1998, and existing ones have to be phased out over a five-year period (KonTraG).
2 Voting caps are illegal as of May 1
st, 1998, and existing ones have to be phased out over a two-year period (KonTraG).56






 1 All segments















Market value of domestic firms (DM Bn.) 795 19 12 826
IPOs of domestic AGs 1977 - 1995 121 127 21 269
Source: DAI Factbook 1996
                                                
1 Geregelter Freiverkehr until April 1987, then Freiverkehr.57
Table 11: Descriptive statistics on share trading and ownership in 1995
1995 All shares Domestic shares
Trading volume
1 (DM Bn.) 1683 1644
Share of total volume by the 5% highest-volume companies 83%
Share of total market value by the 5% highest-valued companies 67%
Trading volume / market capitalization (1993) 114%
Trading volume / GDP (1993) 30%
Market capitalization / GDP (1993) 24%
Shares as a percentage of total assets of private households 5.3%
Percentage of population holding shares 5.5%
Percentage of shares held by private households 14.6%
Shares as a percentage of total financial portfolio of private households 32.8% 21.7%
Percentage of shares held by companies 42.1%
Percentage of shares held by banks 10.3%
Percentage of shares held by investment companies 7.6%
Percentage of shares held by insurance companies 12.4%
Percentage of shares held by government 4.3%
Percentage of shares held by foreign owners 8.7%
Source: DAI Factbook 1996
                                                
1 Volume includes all transactions, regardless of whether the trade is on floor, off floor, by member firms, or by non-member firms. In addition, the reported figures include double counting.58
Table 12: Number of companies by industry and sales in 1990
All companies AG, KGaA, GmbH KG, OHG, GmbH & Co KG Sole proprietorships
Sales in DM Mio. Sales in DM Mio. Sales in DM Mio. Sales in DM Mio.
Industry Total < 5 < 10 < 25 < 100 >=
100
Total < 5 < 10 < 25 < 100 >=
100
Total < 5 < 10 < 25 < 100 >=
100
Total < 5 < 10 >= 10
All companies 61741 23879 11668 12922 9684 3588 28983 9854 5885 6397 4637 2210 19585 4638 3868 5275 4551 1253 12253 9161 1763 1329
Manufacturing 26150 8641 4807 5571 5051 2080 13070 4071 2499 2726 2471 1303 9552 2012 1778 2566 2464 732 3324 2483 498 343
Chemicals 853 127 117 183 250 176 524 83 55 102 134 150 305 34 56 75 114 26 24 10 6 8
Plastics 1564 466 295 398 316 89 934 291 187 225 169 62 508 101 82 154 144 27 121 73 26 22
Rubber 164 52 17 25 34 36 92 23 10 17 20 22 63 21 6 8 14 14 8 ? ? ?
Stone 1402 497 324 322 213 46 477 177 98 79 86 37 794 226 204 231 124 9 128 92 22 14
Ceramics 304 74 52 74 70 34 160 29 30 31 42 28 114 25 17 40 27 5 ? ? ? ?
Iron 1303 357 261 309 269 107 645 181 116 156 125 67 533 91 118 144 140 40 125 85 27 13
NE-Metals 139 16 10 14 45 54 94 10 6 5 31 42 40 ? 4 8 14 11 5 ? ? ?
Foundries 335 69 50 94 101 21 172 41 20 44 53 14 138 17 22 46 46 7 25 11 8 6
Steel 944 310 204 227 162 41 557 186 126 132 85 28 296 56 65 90 72 13 89 66 13 10
Machines 4350 1287 805 1006 883 369 2645 796 512 594 494 249 1354 229 240 385 380 120 346 257 53 36
Cars & Trucks 631 201 123 107 119 81 335 89 77 60 59 50 202 40 30 44 57 31 93 71 16 6
Electronics 1814 471 322 366 433 222 1171 317 221 233 243 157 520 77 76 117 185 65 121 75 25 21
Metal products 1626 466 340 400 318 102 763 236 179 166 137 45 696 110 130 228 172 56 165 118 31 16
Wood 795 429 158 120 72 16 212 85 57 38 26 6 321 133 64 70 44 10 260 210 37 13
Wood products 1546 768 282 248 203 45 671 324 140 117 71 19 511 139 104 115 128 25 358 300 37 21
Paper 143 17 16 26 43 41 65 12 7 10 13 23 73 ? 8 16 29 18 5 ? ? ?
Paper products 535 123 92 139 130 51 281 70 49 69 64 29 213 29 35 63 65 21 41 24 8 9
Printing 1100 439 263 238 143 17 563 248 137 110 60 8 404 99 98 117 81 9 132 91 28 13
Textiles 1257 383 215 282 305 72 526 160 92 100 131 43 605 127 105 172 172 29 125 96 17 12
Clothing 919 303 166 210 194 46 428 142 93 92 81 20 366 74 59 99 108 26 125 87 14 24
Food 2271 774 312 423 461 301 723 154 98 158 189 124 845 173 121 190 222 139 531 398 63 70
Construction 5083 2735 1003 829 430 86 2469 1293 527 415 183 51 1494 480 376 359 244 35 1102 946 99 57
Wholesale 16405 5216 3158 3957 3050 1024 8446 2534 1716 2119 1481 596 4745 965 849 1298 1274 359 2572 1615 478 479
Retail 11742 5883 2327 2334 979 219 4015 1499 980 1036 403 97 3114 831 730 938 503 112 4573 3530 614 429
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank 199659
Table 13: Taxable value (Einheitswert) of commercial companies in 1989 by legal form
1
Legal form Number of
reporting firms




Total 580396 755767 1.30
Individuals 234058 61920 0.26
Companies, of which 346338 693847 2.00
Aktiengesellschaften (AGs), Kommanditgesellschaften auf Aktien (KGaAs) 1774 210366 118.58
Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung (GmbHs) 230037 214839 0.93
Genossenschaften
2 2286 6256 2.74
Offene Handelsgesellschaften (OHGs), Kommanditgesellschaften (KGs), and similar forms 108372 246741 2.28
Firms owned by state and municipalities 1354 12217 9.02
Others 2515 3427 1.36
Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch 1996
                                                
1 West Germany only, excluding financial institutions, insurance companies investment funds, and holding companies.
2 Erwerbs- und Wirtschaftsgenossenschaften.60
Table 14: Sales taxed with value-added tax by legal form and sales in 1992
1
Legal form (Number of firms) Sales in DM Mio., percentage of total taxable sale
 25 000-
50 000
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100 000
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500 000















All (2,631,812) Mio. DM 12 172 31 526 103 428 150 291 228 922 783 980 396 355 570 526 445 591 442 344 3 163 309 6 328 444
% 0.2 0.5 1.6 2.4 3.6 12.4 6.3 9.0 7.0 7.0 50.0 100
Proprietorships (1,926,988) Mio. DM 10 592 27 310 86 125 114 978 152 275 334 783 84 213 71 322 30 037 16 579 22 530 950 743
% 1.1 2.9 9.1 12.1 16.0 35.2 8.9 7.5 3.2 1.7 2.4 100
of which: OHG (210,167) Mio. DM 932 2 250 8 183 12 977 20 032 64 348 31 072 40 297 25 324 23 127 175 191 403 734
% 0.2 0.6 2.0 3.2 5.0 15.9 7.7 10.0 6.3 5.7 43.4 100
KG (87,317) Mio. DM 56 190 972 2 368 6 719 73 794 81 526 176 524 177 081 191 154 709 435 1 419 818
% 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.5 5.2 5.7 12.4 12.5 13.5 50.0 100
AG, KGaA, bergrechtl. Mio. DM 1 5 21 42 109 921 1 078 3 306 5 894 13 252 1 204 503 1 229 132
Gewerkschaften (2,164) % 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.5 1.1 98.0 100
GmbH (359,358) Mio. DM 368 1 219 6 817 18 161 46 597 289 820 182 220 250 276 180 154 164 462 841 237 1 981 329
% 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.9 2.4 14.6 9.2 12.6 9.1 8.3 42.5 100
Cooperatives
2 (10,151) Mio. DM 15 45 170 353 805 8 489 8 119 12 805 11 466 13 578 64 330 120 176
% 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.7 7.1 6.8 10.7 9.5 11.3 53.5 100
Firms owned by state Mio. DM 8 32 168 346 737 3 536 2 151 3 324 3 760 5 073 75 403 94 538
and municipalities (6,012) % 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.8 3.7 2.3 3.5 4.0 5.4 79.8 100
Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch 1996
                                                
1 West Germany only, excluding financial institutions, insurance companies investment funds, and holding companies.
2 Erwerbs- und Wirtschaftsgenossenschaften.61
Table 15: Financial institutions in 1995





All institutions 3622 7538879 2081
Credit banks (Kreditbanken) 335 1824933 5448
State banks (Girozentralen) 13 1370397 105415
State savings banks (Sparkassen) 626 1512917 2417
Cooperative head banks (Genossenschaftliche Zentralbanken) 4 263630 65908
Credit unions (Kreditgenossenschaften) 2591 882082 340
Real estate banks, private and state-owned (Hypothekenbanken, öffentlich-rechtliche
Grundkreditanstalten)
35 968728 27678
Special credit institutions (Kreditinstitute mit Sonderaufgaben) 18 716192 39788
Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch 1996
                                                
1 Excluding assets of foreign subsidiaries and real-estate savings banks (Bausparkassen).62
Table 16: Insurance companies in 1994
Type Number of reporting companies Gross premia in DM Mio. Average gross premia in DM
Mio.
Life insurance 120 83976 700
Pension insurance 1115 3528 3
Health insurance 101 28007 277
Property damage and casualty insurance 777 98820 127
All companies excl. reinsurance 2113 214331 101
Reinsurance 32 55218 1726
Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch 1996Table 17. Reported voting stakes in RWE AG as reported by BAWe







RW Holding Aktiengesellschaft 12.1
Stadt Essen 8.1893997
Allianz Aktiengesellschaft Holding 8.1169996 7.676000118
Quarta-Vermögensverwaltungsgesellschaft mbH 6
Source: BAWe (1996), p. 60Table 18. Reported voting stakes in Aachener und Münchener Versicherung AG
Name of shareholder Direct Direct &
attributed
Attributed Blocks
AMB Aachener und Münchener Beteiligungs-
Aktiengesellschaft
75.50 77.00 1.50 77.00
Source: BAWe (1996) and own calculationsTable 19. Reported voting stakes in AGIV AG: Source of attributed votes is ambiguous
Name of shareholder Direct Direct and attributed Attributed Blocks
BHF-Bank AG 48.70 48.70 48.70
EVS AG 0.00 10.01 10.01 10.01?
STOCK Beteiligungsgesellschaft mbH 10.01 10.01 0.00?
Source: BAWe (1996) and own calculationsTable 20. Reported voting stakes in Rhenag AG: Parent company is ambiguous
Name of shareholder Direct Direct and attributed Attributed Blocks
RWE AG 0.00 54.09 54.09 54.09
RWE Energie AG 54.09 54.09
Preussen Elektra AG 0.00 40.00 40.00 ?
VEBA AG 0.00 40.00 40.00 40.00
Thüga AG 40.00 40.00
Source: BAWe (1996) and own calculations.Table 21. Reported voting stakes in Markt- und Kühlhallen AG: Number of blocks
Name of shareholder Direct Direct and
attributed
Attributed Blocks
DIB Industriebeteiligung GmbH & Co. Holding KG 0.00 41.41 41.41
Doblinger, Alfons 0.00 41.41 41.41 41.41
Doblinger Industriebeteiligung KG 41.41 41.41
BB-Kapitalbeteiligungsgesellschaft mbH 41.40 41.40 41.40
Source: BAWe (1996) and own calculations.Table 22. Notified voting stakes in Monachia AG: Number of blocks
Name of Shareholder Direct Direct & Attributed Attributed Blocks
RWE Aktiengesellschaft 0.00 45.22 45.22 45.22
Allianz Aktiengesellschaft Holding 45.22 45.22 45.22
HOCHTIEF Aktiengesellschaft 45.22 45.22 ?
Source: BAWe (1996) and own calculations.Table 23. Number of entries per notified company















Source: BAWe (1996, 97, 98) and own calculations. Note: BAWe (1996) lists 404 companies, but two
companies had a double entry, reducing the actual number of companies to 402. These were matched to a list of
all companies listed on an official market obtained by transcribing the Börsenzeitung of 11 January 1997. After
eliminating special cases, 430 companies were investigated. Seven companies had not received any notifications
(0 entries in the table). See the main text for further details on the construction of the dataset.Table 24. Companies with the largest number of notifications
Company name Number of
entries
Type of owners
PORSCHE, Dr. Ing. h. c., F., Aktiengesellschaft 14 family pool
Tarkett Aktiengesellschaft 14 Standard Chartered Bank,
Goldman Sachs, and several
subsidiaries
SAP Aktiengesellschaft 11 founders and their holdings
Flachglas Aktiengesellschaft 10 Elders Glass Ltd and all
subsidiaries (including
Dahlbusch AG)
SCHWARZ Pharma Aktiengesellschaft 10 pool of heirs
(Erbengemeinschaft)
Dahlbusch Aktiengesellschaft 9 Elders Glass Ltd and all
subsidiaries




FUCHS Petrolub AG Oel + Chemie 8 Fuchs family holdings and
banks (the latter direct)
STEUCON Grundbesitz- und Beteiligungs-Aktiengesellschaft 8 family members over 5% and
holdings
VBH Vereinigter Baubeschlag-Handel Aktiengesellschaft 8 family pool
ZWL Grundbesitz- und Beteiligungs-Aktiengesellschaft 8 family pool and holdings
Source: BAWe (1996) and own calculationsTable 25. Reported voting stakes in Tarkett AG: Number of entries per voting block vs.
information content
Name of shareholder Direct Direct and
attributed
Attributed Blocks
Advisory Partners, L. P. 0.00 28.87 28.87
Chartered Financial Holdings Limited 0.00 32.73 32.73
CWB Capital Partners (Investments) Limited 0.00 32.73 32.73
CWB Capital Partners (Nominees) Limited 32.73 32.73
CWB Capital Partners Limited 0.00 32.73 32.73
Goldman Sachs & Co. Verwaltungs GmbH 12.19 12.19
Goldman Sachs Advisors, Inc. 0.00 28.87 28.87
Goldman Sachs Advisors, L. P. 0.00 28.87 28.87 28.87
Goldman Sachs Capital Partners, L. P. 9.58 28.87 19.29
Goldman Sachs Invest. Partners Esp. C.V. 7.10 7.10
Rhein-Donau Capital Partners 0.00 12.19 12.19
Standard Chartered (SFD No. 1) Limited 0.00 32.73 32.73
Standard Chartered (SFD No. 2) Limited 0.00 32.73 32.73
Standard Chartered Bank 0.00 32.73 32.73 32.73
Source: BAWe (1996) and own calculationsTable 26. Reported voting stakes in Herlitz AG: Informal family pools are not reported
Name of shareholder Direct Direct and attributed Attributed Blocks
Herlitz, Günter 6.36 6.36 6.36
Herlitz, Dr., Klaus 3.60 5.13 1.52 5.13
Source: BAWe (1996) and own calculationsTable 27. Reported voting stakes in Veba AG
Name of shareholder Direct Direct and
attributed
Attributed Blocks
Allianz Aktiengesellschaft Holding 0.01 11.46 11.45 11.46
Lambda-Vermögensverwaltungsgesellschaft mbH 10.20 10.20 ?
Source: BAWe (1996) and own calculations.Table 28. Exercised votes at Veba AG’s annual general meeting, 23 May 1996












Dresdner Bank 0 0 405,939,535 405,939,535 33.29% 16.63%
Deutsche Bank 0 0 113,401,145 113,401,145 9.30% 4.65%
Commerzbank 0 0 22,793,400 22,793,400 1.87% 0.93%
BHF-Bank 0 0 24,426,855 24,426,855 2.00% 1.00%
Bayerische Hypobank 0 0 16,782,800 16,782,800 1.38% 0.69%
Bayerische Vereinsbank 0 0 13,968,900 13,968,900 1.15% 0.57%
Chase Bank 0 0 36,202,560 36,202,560 2.97% 1.48%
Vereins-u. Westbank 0 0 13,387,755 13,387,755 1.10% 0.55%
Bankgesellschaft Berlin 5,780,800 0 2,197,795 7,978,595 0.65% 0.33%
Other German private banks 0 400,000 112,129,320 112,529,320 9.23% 4.61%
Foreign Banks 0 0 6,410,420 6,410,420 0.53% 0.26%
WestLB 0 0 42,820,065 42,820,065 3.51% 1.75%
NordLB 0 0 14,615,585 14,615,585 1.20% 0.60%
Other state banks 75,000 0 34,702,220 34,777,220 2.85% 1.42%
DG Bank 0 0 14,982,660 14,982,660 1.23% 0.61%
Other credit unions 0 0 18,244,415 18,244,415 1.50% 0.75%
Kapitalanlagegesellschaften 0 219,512,250 0 216,715,250 17.77% 8.88%
Allianz
Kapitalanlagegesellschaft
0 0 2,797,000 2,797,000 0.23% 0.11%
Other Companies 3,200 93,552,800 0 93,556,000 7.67% 3.83%
Shareholder Associations 0 1,258,950 1,815,005 3,073,955 0.25% 0.13%
Small Shareholders
Attending
N/A. N/A. N/A. 4,019,820 0.33% 0.16%
Total Attending 1,219,423,255 100.00% 49.96%
Total Not Attending 1,221,472,445 50.04%
Total Par Value 2,440,895,700 100.00%
Source: VEBA AG and own calculationsTable 29. Reported voting stakes in DEPFA AG: No group structure reported
Name of shareholder Direct Direct and
attributed
Attributed Blocks
DEPFA Holding mbH 40.00 40.00 40.00
Source: BAWe (1996)77
Table 30. Concentration of voting blocks of 430 officially listed Aktiengesellschaften
C1 C3 C5 Call
A. Empirical Distribution
Range Freq. % Cum. % Freq. % Cum. % Freq. % Cum. % Freq. % Cum. %
0-4.99 7 1.63 1.63 7 1.63 1.63 7 1.63 1.63 7 1.63 1.63
5-9.99 10 2.33 3.95 8 1.86 3.49 8 1.86 3.49 8 1.86 3.49
10-14.99 25 5.81 9.77 11 2.56 6.05 11 2.56 6.05 11 2.56 6.05
15-19.99 15 3.49 13.26 4 0.93 6.98 4 0.93 6.98 4 0.93 6.98
20-24.99 19 4.42 17.67 4 0.93 7.91 4 0.93 7.91 4 0.93 7.91
25-29.99 32 7.44 25.12 12 2.79 10.7 12 2.79 10.7 12 2.79 10.7
30-34.99 11 2.56 27.67 16 3.72 14.42 12 2.79 13.49 12 2.79 13.49
35-39.99 9 2.09 29.77 12 2.79 17.21 11 2.56 16.05 11 2.56 16.05
40-44.99 11 2.56 32.33 12 2.79 20 10 2.33 18.37 10 2.33 18.37
45-49.99 13 3.02 35.35 17 3.95 23.95 15 3.49 21.86 14 3.26 21.63
50-54.99 39 9.07 44.42 18 4.19 28.14 15 3.49 25.35 16 3.72 25.35
55-59.99 13 3.02 47.44 16 3.72 31.86 12 2.79 28.14 11 2.56 27.91
60-64.99 21 4.88 52.33 22 5.12 36.98 27 6.28 34.42 26 6.05 33.95
65-69.99 12 2.79 55.12 16 3.72 40.7 15 3.49 37.91 15 3.49 37.44
70-74.99 20 4.65 59.77 21 4.88 45.58 19 4.42 42.33 19 4.42 41.86
75-79.99 49 11.4 71.16 53 12.33 57.91 58 13.49 55.81 57 13.26 55.12
80-84.99 11 2.56 73.72 28 6.51 64.42 29 6.74 62.56 31 7.21 62.33
85-89.99 21 4.88 78.6 33 7.67 72.09 36 8.37 70.93 37 8.6 70.93
90-94.99 27 6.28 84.88 36 8.37 80.47 37 8.6 79.53 36 8.37 79.3
95-100 65 15.12 100 84 19.53 100 88 20.47 100 89 20.7 100
Total 430 100 430 100 430 100 430 100
B. Descriptive Statistics
Min. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Median 62.4 75.4 76.2 76.5
Mean 58.9 68.7 70.0 70.2
Max. 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Cn is defined as the sum of the n largest voting blocks per company. Source: BAWe (1996, 97, 98) and own
calculations. Note: BAWe (1996) lists 404 companies, but two companies had a double entry, reducing the actual
number of companies to 402. These were matched to a list of all companies listed on an official market obtained by
transcribing the Börsenzeitung of 11 January 1997. After eliminating special cases, 430 companies were investigated.
Seven companies had received no notifications (0 entries in the table). See text for further details on the construction of
the dataset.78






1 256 59.5 59.5
2 88 20.5 80.0
3 38 8.8 88.8
4 35 8.1 97.0
5 5 1.2 98.1
6 6 1.4 99.5
7 1 0.2 99.8
8 1 0.2 100.0
Total 430 100
Source: BAWe (1996, 97, 98) and own calculations. Note: BAWe (1996) lists 404 companies, but two
companies had a double entry, reducing the actual number of companies to 402. These were matched to a list of
all companies listed on an official market obtained by transcribing the Börsenzeitung of 11 January 1997. After
eliminating special cases, 430 companies were investigated. Seven companies had not received any notifications
(0 entries in the table). See the main text for further details on the construction of the dataset.79
Table 32. Shareholders controlling votes in 4 or more officially listed Aktiengesellschaften
Blockholder Name N Mean Median Min. Max.
Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft 27 22.3 11.0 5.0 94.3
Allianz Aktiengesellschaft Holding 25 17.0 12.4 5.0 46.5
VIAG Aktiengesellschaft 14 48.4 50.6 6.8 98.3
Dresdner Bank Aktiengesellschaft 14 28.0 14.5 6.5 96.5
Münchener Rückversicherungs-Gesellschaft Aktiengesellschaft 14 23.8 15.3 5.0 96.7
RWE Aktiengesellschaft 10 65.0 65.2 34.9 99.5
Bayerische Vereinsbank Aktiengesellschaft 9 56.3 75.0 9.9 85.4
Commerzbank Aktiengesellschaft 8 28.7 12.2 10.0 97.5
VEBA Aktiengesellschaft 6 37.6 41.7 14.0 56.3
DG Bank, Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank 6 18.2 8.5 5.4 55.4
Bayerische Hypotheken- und Wechselbank Aktiengesellschaft 6 34.7 29.9 5.0 75.8
Oetker, Rudolf August 5 82.8 86.7 64.0 96.6
METRO Holding Aktiengesellschaft 5 80.2 75.8 67.2 95.6
Bayerische Landesbank Girozentrale 5 28.6 25.0 10.0 61.4
Deutsche Babcock Aktiengesellschaft 5 69.7 67.3 65.5 75.5
WestLB Westdeutsche Landesbank, Girozentrale 5 12.9 9.7 7.2 29.1
BW Bank Baden-Württembergische Bank Aktiengesellschaft 5 10.8 12.6 6.3 15.0
AMB Aachener und Münchener Beteiligungs-Aktiengesellschaft 5 81.3 77.0 75.2 98.4
Württembergische Aktiengesellschaft Versicherungs-
Beteiligungsgesellschaft
5 39.7 25.1 5.0 97.3
Merckle, Adolf 4 33.6 30.5 10.4 63.2
Gothaer Lebensversicherung a. G. 4 19.7 10.0 10.0 48.9
Schickedanz Holding-Stiftung & Co. KG 4 65.1 69.5 25.0 96.6
AGIV Aktiengesellschaft für Industrie und Verkehrswesen 4 70.8 67.8 50.6 96.9
Bayerische Braustiftung Josef Schörghuber & Co. Holding KG 4 79.1 84.5 49.3 98.1
BHF-Bank Berliner Handels- und Frankfurter Bank
Aktiengesellschaft
4 34.7 29.4 5.1 75.180







1 437 85.02 85.02
2 41 7.98 93
3 11 2.14 95.14
4 6 1.17 96.3
5 8 1.56 97.86
6 3 0.58 98.44
8 1 0.19 98.64
9 1 0.19 98.83
10 1 0.19 99.03
14 3 0.58 99.61
25 1 0.19 99.81
27 1 0.19 100
Total 514 100
Source: BAWe (1996, 97, 98) and own calculations.Table 34. Control of voting blocks by blockholder type of shareholder in 430 officially listed
Aktiengesellschaften










Foreign government 3 13.0 20.2 18.9 23.6
Bank 116 5.0 15.0 29.0 99.0




21 5.9 49.1 45.2 100.0
Government 23 8.2 37.5 43.9 99.0
Holding 59 6.2 42.9 51.0 100.0
Investment firm 41 5.5 25.2 39.8 99.0
Bank-related
investment firm
11 5.0 25.1 30.6 97.3
Individual 207 5.0 18.2 27.2 100.0
Foundation 17 8.0 50.0 49.2 98.1
Insurance firm 71 5.0 12.9 27.7 99.3
Total 755 5.0 25.1 40.0 100.0Figure 1. The Mechanics of the Notification and Publication Process
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Shareholders who hold shares that have a vote at the annual general meeting of German companies listed in an
official EU market have to notify this company and the competent authority (BAWe) when their holding rises or
falls above or below 5%, 10%, 25%, 50%, or 75% of the total votes attributable to the share type. For first time
notifications during 1995, special rules applied. The initial notification threshold was 5%. All companies listed
on a German official market must publish a notification in a German financial paper that has been awarded the
privilege of publishing such notifications by the relevant German stock exchange(s). Until recently, the company
had to publish a note in the official government newspaper (Bundesanzeiger), indicating in which newspaper(s)
the notification is published. If the company is listed on another market within the EU the company has to
publish the same information in a similar local newspaper in the local language. The companies also provide the
competent authority (BAWe) with copies of the published notifications. The shareholder has to notify the
company and the competent authority within 7 calendar days and the company must publish the information
within 9 days. Hence, a maximum of 16 days can pass from the day the shareholder crossed the threshold and the
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Source: Markus (Update 26, Nov. 1996), Wer gehört zu wem (1994).84
Figure 3. Voting blocks by rank of stakes for 430 officially listed Aktiengesellschaften
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Largest Stake 2nd 3rd 4-10th >10
Minimum Median Mean Maximum
For each of the 430 companies, we first rank the voting blocks in these firms. For each category the minimum,
median, mean, and maximum are represented in the figure.85
























Fraction of the data








Note: For each company the largest voting block was selected and the 430 blocks were ranked by size. The
horizontal axis shows the corresponding percentiles, the vertical axis the size of the block. The important
corporate governance thresholds (10% for individual anti-director rights, 25% to block statute changes, 50%
majority, and 75% super-majority) are clearly visible.86
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See below for a definition of the categories on the horizontal axis. The figure shows a standard box-and-whisker plot.
The box extends from the 25th to the 75th percentile and the line in the middle of the box is drawn at the median. The
line connecting the box with the upper bar (whisker) is drawn from the 75
th percentile to the data point (upper adjacent
value) equal or just below a value given by the 75th percentile plus 1.5 the interquartile range. Larger data points, if
applicable, are marked individually (outside values). The width of the boxes is proportional to the number of
observations in the category.
Code  Blockholder type Comments





idea behind pooling these: a limited number of individuals shares
control
g Government
h Holding Verwaltungsgesellschaften, Holdings
i Investment firm Beteiligungsgesellschaften
j Church
k Bank-related investment firm (not exhaustive)
p Individual includes KGs that are named after an individual
s Foundation
v Insurance firm